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 Synopsis 
 
 The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami disaster caused the deaths of 300.000 people, forced over 
one million to displacement, and estimated property damage results in billions of dollars. 
Images of drowned bodies, whole cities levelled with the ground and portraits of the tragic 
destinies of survivors flashed our television screens for weeks. Half a year later, the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami Warning System was formally established as the solution to prevent future 
tsunami disasters. In this thesis I aim to shed light to the construction of not only the tsunami 
warning system, but also the construction of disasters. Based on the analysis of the United 
Nations report from the World Conference on Disaster Reduction held in Hyogo in Kobe, 
Japan in January 2005, I will investigate how central bodies in the field of disaster reduction 
conceptualise a natural disaster, and subsequently the means with which they should be 
fought.  
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Building Resilience 
Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
Tsu nami. These are originally Japanese words meaning harbour waves, and for many of us 
they were fairly unknown until December 26, 2004. On this morning, an earthquake off the 
coast of Northern Sumatra in the Indian Ocean provoked a wave train towering up to ten 
metres in height, which hit the coastal areas of eleven countries in the region with devastating 
effects. These strong and extremely energetic waves crossed entire oceans, but were only 
centimetres high in the most peripheral areas. An estimated seventy thousand people were 
killed immediately, and the most recent numbers from the United Nations count an estimation 
of 300.000 perished, many of whom are still missing, over a million people were forced to 
displacement and property damage is estimated to several billions US dollars (ISDR: Progress 
and further requirements for the development of a Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System 
for the Indian Ocean). On daily basis the brutal stories of people’s tragic destinies were 
broadcasted into our homes through television, radio and newspapers. A global demand for 
action arose: This must never be allowed to happen again. 
 For centuries, man has attempted to gain control over nature by developing 
increasingly advanced technology. After the December 2004 tsunami disaster, the high 
priority project in the fight against future tsunami disasters became the establishment of the 
Indian Ocean Tsunami Early Warning System. This is recommended by the United Nations in 
order to build the resilience of nations and communities to disasters (Hyogo Framework for 
Action). On June 30, 2005, the 23  assembly of UNESCO’s Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Commission announced that an the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and 
Mitigation System was formally established with an Intergovernmental Oceanographic 
Commission to govern it, and at the time this is written, the system is expected to be fully 
operational by July 2006. 
rd
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Research Question 
When the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster occurred, I, like millions of people all over the 
world, reacted with shock and almost disbelief on the despair and human suffering that were 
televised into my living room. Few, if any disasters had before been subject to so extensive 
media coverage, which was perhaps utterly intensified by the fact that several thousand 
western tourists were killed and otherwise affected by the tsunami. The media coverage in the 
time following seemed to be heavily dominated by portraits of human suffering as a direct 
consequence of the “monster wave”. The subject of tsunami early warning systems – or the 
lack of such - soon found its way into the centre of media attention, and public discussion 
emerged about how the disaster could have been avoided, or at least considerably reduced if 
only there had been such a system in the Indian Ocean. As a fresh Science, Technology and 
Society student, I started thinking about why we always seem to turn to technological 
solutions, even when the problems may be of social or environmental character. 
Disasters happen. However, why they happen and by what means they should be 
fought are subject to deviant opinions and explanations. In this thesis I will explore how 
tsunami and natural disasters are defined and interpreted by bodies that deal with international 
strategies and policy in the field of disaster risk reduction. By using the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami Warning System as case, I will look deeper into the role of science and technology 
in relation to natural disasters. Central questions will be: How do we conceptualise natural 
disasters? Which causal explanations do we attribute to them, and with which measures do we 
react upon them? When this is written, the work on the tsunami warning system in the Indian 
Ocean has been going on for over a year. Use of technology as “problem-solver” has long 
traditions in disaster management, and in all areas of society for that matter. To investigate the 
societal effects of technology is one of the oldest topics in technology studies, and for a long 
time technology was commonly apprehended as neutral. To provide a somewhat banal 
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example: A spade can be used to dig a flowerbed in the garden, or to hit someone in the back 
of the head. We choose how to use it and the technological artefact, the spade itself, is hence 
neutral and non-political. It is considered to be either good or bad, depending on how we use 
it. In the later years this view has been contested, and the question of whether artefacts have 
politics or not has been subject of debate (see for instance L. Winner, 1986). The technology – 
society relationship will also be problematised in this thesis. 
In order to investigate these questions I will collect empirical data from the report 
from the World Conference on Disaster Reduction held in Japan only weeks after the Indian 
Ocean tsunami, and the findings from the report will be analysed in the light of the different 
theories presented next. But before I move on I would like to point out that this paper is not 
intended to be an analysis of how the system functions in practice, and it is not an actor-
oriented approach. The general aim is rather to investigate how central bodies dealing with 
disaster reduction define natural disasters and the means to prevent them, keeping particular 
attention on technological solutions. 
 
Theoretical Framework and Conceptual Issues  
The theoretical framework will be divided into two sections. First I wish to give account for 
conceptual issues that are important to capture the angle of the thesis, and further elaborate a 
notion about attribution of causality. The second section will contain a short presentation of 
the Science, Technology and Society Field and the theories that will be used throughout the 
analysis.    
  “The tsunami disaster” has now become a common term referring to the December 
2004 event in the Indian Ocean. However, definitions of exactly what constitutes a natural 
disaster can be subject to constructions of deviant meaning and knowledge. I will continue to 
use the term natural disaster throughout this paper, but wish to emphasize that the concept can 
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be ambiguous, depending on definitions of what is natural and what is social. In order to 
provide definitions of the most relevant terms for the thesis, I choose to quote the United 
Nations since these appear to be the ones most commonly accepted.  
As defined by the United Nations, a natural disaster refers to “[a] serious disruption 
triggered by a natural hazard causing human, material, economic or environmental losses, 
which exceed the ability of those affected to cope” (UNDP: Glossary of Terms). A hazard is 
further defined as a “potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that 
may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or 
environmental degradation” (UN/ISDR Terminology). As will be elaborated later in the 
thesis, the term vulnerability has become a key concept in evaluating exposure and risk to 
natural hazards during the last three decades. But the meanings, perquisites and causes 
different actors lay in the notion of vulnerability can still be fluctuating. Vulnerability is 
defined by the United Nations as: “The conditions determined by physical, social, economic 
and environmental factors or processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to 
the impact of hazards (UN/ISDR Terminology). Vulnerability is often seen in the context of 
risk, which is used when attempting to calculate the possibility of a disaster happening in 
certain areas, and a probabilistic calculation of risk includes evaluating the probability of a 
hazard or event occurring multiplied with its consequences. Risk can be defined as “[t]he 
probability of harmful consequences, or expected losses (deaths, injuries, property, 
livelihoods, economic activity disrupted or environment damaged) resulting from interactions 
between natural or human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions” (UN/ISDR 
Terminology). Resilience is the conceptual opposite of vulnerability and can be defined as 
“The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by 
resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and 
structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of organising 
 12
Building Resilience 
itself to increase this capacity for learning from past disasters for better future protection and 
to improve risk reduction measures” (UN/ISDR Terminology). The definitions listed above 
will be the ones used throughout the paper if not otherwise is specified.  
The attribution of causality to disasters to nature on the one hand, or society on the 
other, has long been subject to dispute and divergence. Commonly accepted truths here and 
now are seldom eternal truths, and neutral objective criteria for assessing “validity” of 
knowledge do not exists (some will perhaps claim that it does, but these criteria will be social 
constructs too). Nature can sometimes be perceived as an uncontrollable enemy who 
continually threatens to invade and destroy human society, or on the other hand as the 
condition for the very existence of human society. Either way, the borders between the social 
and the natural will always be context-dependent social constructs rooted in different 
historical, social and cultural processes.  
 
Theoretical Framework and Science, Technology and Society 
The science, technology and society (STS) tradition claims that technologies are never purely 
technical, but are shaped by and reflect the complex disparate factors and trade-offs that 
together constitute and are constituted by our society. This interdisciplinary and relatively 
young domain of social sciences was born as a response to the increasing awareness that 
science and technology are deeply embedded in social and cultural processes, and cannot be 
studied in isolation from these. Technologies are social constructs, some apparent and other 
less so, and form an inevitable part of our culture. (Bijker and Law, 1992). Also in relation to 
disaster prevention and mitigation, technology has become an integrated part of both pre- and 
post-disaster reduction strategies. 
When analysing the relationship between technology and society, three traditional 
directions can be identified. The idea of technological determinism involves two elements 
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including that technological development is autonomous, and secondly that it exercises great 
influence on societal development (Sejersted, 1998). Secondly, the approach that regards 
technology as neutral claims that it is people who decide whether the technology is good or 
bad, depending on how we choose to use it. We decide how to use them, but the technology in 
itself is neutral and non-political (Winner, 1986). Constructivism does not only concentrate on 
the usages and effects of technology, but also on how it is produced and embedded in specific 
historical, social and cultural settings and networks (Bijker, 1994). It is today commonly 
recognised among STS scholars that technological systems always go beyond their technical 
components. When technological solutions are introduced as tools in disaster mitigation, STS 
studies may provide a useful contribution in order to avoid determinism and black boxing of 
the technology. This black boxing happens when technologies are regarded as something 
given in isolation from social, political, economical and cultural factors (Asdal and 
Myklebust, 1999). 
In today’s society we use all sort of modern technologies on daily basis without 
sacrificing a thought on how it has become like this. We appear to have unwavering faith in 
science and technology to make our lives and societies safer and better. Turning to scientific, 
technological and instrumental solutions seem to be a characteristic tendency in our society. 
In the following section I will provide a brief presentation of two scholars that are engaged 
with theories on societal risks and vulnerability related to modern scientific and technological 
development. Additionally, I will also present a third theoretical direction that is more directly 
concerned with theories of risk and vulnerability to natural disasters. All of these will be 
further elaborated in chapter three.    
The German sociologist Ulrich Beck is an influential contemporary thinker who has 
dedicated his research to exploring what he calls “The Risk Society”. He argues that the 
multiple risks we face today such as air pollution or the risk of terrorist attacks are the effect - 
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or side effect - of the modern scientific and technological development. His works present a 
critical macro-social theory in which he claims that using science and technology to deal with 
the multiple risks we face is a paradox, since science and technology are the causes of modern 
risk. Even though Beck himself states that the theory is not elaborated in concern of risk to 
natural disasters, I will nevertheless try to link Beck’s notion of risk with this subject.  
I will further make use of the works of Professor Wiebe Bijker. The Dutchman is a 
central STS scholar who is primarily concerned with the social construction of technology in 
the light of how it influences society and nature and vice versa, how it develops, and in turn, 
how it can be controlled. He has also published articles in which he analyses the 
vulnerabilities related to modern technology within social frames in what he calls our 
“technological culture”. Both Beck and Bijker agrees that the risks we face today are 
outcomes of scientific and technological development, but Bijker’s view differs from Beck’s 
as he claims that science and technology at the same time can contribute to making our 
societies safer.  
The third theoretical direction I will present is the domain of what I choose to call 
Academic Disaster Theories, which is an interdisciplinary approach within the social sciences, 
which is exclusively concerned with risk and vulnerability to disasters. In this paper I will 
concentrate theories associated with risk to natural hazards, neglecting the field of disaster 
studies concerned technological hazards. This domain is mainly concerned with analysing risk 
and vulnerability in terms of the social, political and economic processes, and condemns that 
disasters are created by natural hazards only. I will use the insight obtained from the theories 
to investigate the empirical findings in the light of these three directions. 
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Method 
The first step after deciding on the thesis topic was to review literature on a broad basis about 
tsunami, natural hazards, disasters, vulnerability and risk, and also relevant United Nations 
key reports. The literature and articles were used to provide a general overview over debates 
of current interest, and the United Nations reports have given good accounts for international 
strategies and policies related to natural disasters. After reviewing numerous reports available 
at the United Nations’ web pages, I identified one report that stood out as the most important 
one for my purposes. As the most central step in collecting information and empirical data to 
the case, I have conducted a thorough content analysis of the report from the World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction. This Conference, which took place in Japan only few 
weeks after the Indian Ocean tsunami, is commonly regarded to be the single most important 
event related to disaster reduction in our time. During the conference, conceptual frameworks 
and goals and strategies for global disaster reduction for the next decade were defined and 
adopted by its well over 4.000 participants. 
Additionally, I have performed semi-structured qualitative research interviews. My 
interview objects are professional academic disaster experts, a seismologist, a journalist and 
former information worker in a Norwegian governmental foreign aid organisation, an 
employee in the Norwegian Refugee Council working in the field in the Aceh province in 
Sumatra, and a first hand witness of the Indian Ocean tsunami. These have been face-to-face 
depth interviews where the respondents have been free to speak about what he or she wanted 
on the broad topic of the interview. The interviews were used as a step in collecting 
background information and illuminate different angles of the thesis topic, and provided 
useful information and inputs for the thesis. They are, however, not analysed as part of the 
empirical foundation of the thesis.   
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Thesis Structure 
Chapter two concentrates on explaining what happened on December 26, 2004 to provide 
background information for the case. I will also provide a thorough description of the 
technical parts of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System, and give account for already 
existing tsunami warning systems. Chapter three will contain a presentation of the theoretical 
framework for the thesis, and the theories presented will also be compared and discussed 
along the way. In Chapter four I will present the analysis of the Report from the World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction. This chapter will also contain an integrated discussion 
about the findings that are analysed in light of the theories presented in chapter three. Finally, 
in the fifth and concluding chapter, I will sum up the most important issues and discussions in 
the thesis, and provide overall conclusion about the findings 
 17
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Monster Waves Strike 
“My wife and I woke up just before ten p.m. Boxing Day. Normally we would have 
been at the beach at that time, but it got pretty late the night before so we slept in. We 
both woke up of an extremely loud strange roaring noise coming from outside. We 
lived in a large hotel on the third floor about 500 meters from the beach, facing away 
from the shoreline and towards the city. As we jumped up and looked out the window, 
we saw all that dirty brown water with tuk tuks, sun lounges, logs and people floating 
in the streets. People were screaming and trying to find their children, so we got into 
our clothes and ran down to the hotel swimming pool to help. Halfway towards the 
pool we heard the roaring and rumbling again, only ten times louder than the first 
time. The noise was just insane! We stopped and saw a six meters high massive wall 
of water filled with people, lampposts, pick-up trucks, sun lounges, and trees coming 
towards us. It did not look like a wave, but more as if the whole sea was moving. We 
still did not understand what was going on, and the thought about a second wave 
coming had never occurred to us. But there it was coming towards us, and as we saw 
it, we just froze. Everyone just froze, stopped and just looked at each other for a few 
seconds. And then we turned around and ran. People panicked, and some ran 
screaming straight into the water. My wife and I were lucky and managed to get up to 
the hotel roof. There we sat for sixteen or seventeen hours and did not dare to move in 
fear of the rumours going around about a seventy meters high wave coming in” (Erik 
Friesl, tourist in Thailand, Christmas 2004). 
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On the early morning of December 26, 2004, a tsunami triggered by a series of strong 
earthquakes off the West coast of Northern Sumatra swept across the shores of eleven 
countries in the Indian Ocean. Within minutes in the areas nearest the earthquake epicentre, 
and within a few hours in more distant coasts, people lost their homes, their livelihoods, got 
injured, and tens of thousands of people were killed instantly. Erik Friesl and his wife were 
going to spend Christmas in Patong Beach in Phuket, but the trip ended after three days. They 
were lucky and returned home dry shod without physical injuries, but the time following has 
been tough. The sound and the stench from the waves, the despair and feelings of helplessness 
and guilt for surviving do not let go very easily.  
Those of us spending Christmas safe in our homes in Europe and other parts of the 
world woke up to extra news broadcasts in the early morning of December 26, 2004. Images 
of crushed beach lines and people in despair filled the television screen every hour of the day. 
Hours and days went by, and the number of fatalities was estimated to three thousand at first, 
increased to seven thousand, and then to twenty thousand. The death toll continued to grow 
for weeks, and is now believed to have exceeded 300.000, including those who died from 
trauma and drowning from the flux of seawater, and water born debris (Progress and further 
requirements for the development of a Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System in the Indian 
Ocean). Indonesia suffered the biggest loss of human lives, and by June 2005, a total of 
167.736 persons are confirmed dead or still missing. Sri Lankan authorities report of 35.322 
deaths; the Thai government of 8.212, and India of 18.045 fatalities or still missing persons. 
Other countries suffering causalities and damage are Malaysia, the Maldives, Myanmar, 
Bangladesh, and some countries on the African East Coast (Tsunami Special Envoy).  
In the following section I will give a presentation of the tsunami hazard and the 
warning system designed to monitor it. I do not know how the system actually works in 
practice, and neither can I boast about particular knowledge of seismological processes, so I 
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wish to emphasise that this is only a description, not an analysis. The information presented in 
this chapter is taken from books on the subject, but first and foremost from my informant 
Hein Haak who works as seismologist at The Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute. 
 
The Tsunami Hazard 
Tsunami1 are triggered by sudden disruptive changes in the ocean floor such as submarine 
earthquakes causing vertical movements of the sea floor, submarine volcanic eruptions, 
meteor impacts, or coastal (underwater or into the water) land-slides (Tsunami Warning 
Systems and Procedure). When travelling over deep ocean with a speed up to 800 kilometres 
per hour, the waves are hardly noticeable at the ocean surface with the height of only a few 
centimetres. But as the waves eventually approach more shallow waters on coastlines, they 
will slow down and can pile up to giant walls of water. The wave height varies from only 
centimetres to over a hundred meters, and can sweep kilometres inland from the beach shore. 
The powers of tsunami waves are tremendous, and even a smaller one can cause extensive 
destruction. For a submarine earthquake to produce tsunami, the disruption has to provoke 
vertical movement of the ocean floor of several meters and over a large area, forcing the water 
to move (Tsunami: The great waves). In the largest tsunamigenic earthquakes, as much as 
100.000 square kilometres or even more of the sea floor are moved several meters in vertical 
direction, causing the overlying water to travel outwards from the source region as a series of 
waves (Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific: Master Plan 1999).  
 The nature of tsunami differs from other types of waves, such as wind and tidal waves. 
While tsunami are shallow water waves, wind waves are deep-water waves. The latter has a 
wavelength, or a movement, which is small compared to the depth, meaning that deep-water 
waves can only provoke movement at the ocean surface. In contrast, the movement of 
                                                 
1 Many English writers add an s when writing the plural form of tsunami. However, in Japanese the singular and 
the plural form of the word is the same (Bryant, 2001), and the Japanese form will be used throughout this text. 
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earthquake-generated tsunami is provoked at the sea floor, and can thus be registered in 
extreme ocean depths. The horizontal movement is larger than the vertical movement, and as 
a consequence a tsunami can hardly be noticed on the surface in deep oceans. Energy is 
dissipated progressively in all directions from the earthquake, and as the waves approaches 
shallow water near the coast, velocity decreases and the waves grow in height. The process 
can compare to a highway filled with cars, in which speed reduction causes traffic jams. 
However, while cars have manual breaks, water does not. As the massive waves loose volume 
in breadth and depth, there remains no other option than to regain this volume in height. 
Figure 2.1: Illustration of tsunami propagation 
Source: http://www.knmi.nl/~haak/Sumatra20041226.ppt  
 
Most of the destructive tsunami can be classified as either local or regional, meaning the 
destructive impact is confined to coastlines within a hundred kilometres, or up to a thousand 
kilometres. Far less frequent, but then again potentially far more hazardous, are the ocean-
wide or distant tsunami. They appear as local tsunami at coastlines near the source, but these 
waves continue to travel across the entire ocean basin with sufficient energy to cause damage 
on shores more than a thousand kilometres away. An estimated eighty per cent of the ocean-
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wide tsunami occur in the Pacific (see figure 2.2), and until now this has been the only area 
with an established warning system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 .2: Overview of damaging and non-damaging tsunami. 
Source: http://www.knmi.nl/~haak/Sumatra20041226.ppt
 
On December 26, 2004, the Indian Ocean tsunami caught the unprepared States and 
inhabitants in the region off guard, and the proposal of establishing an early warning system 
was soon forwarded in the wake of the disaster. The Indian Ocean tsunami is considered to be 
one of the strongest and deadliest in known world history. The immediate hazard was over in 
 23
Building Resilience 
a matter of hours, but its disastrous consequences for the people affected will take decades, or 
even lifetimes, to cope with. Many survivors who lost their homes and families had nothing to 
return to. In some particularly exposed and flat areas like in Banda Aceh in Sumatra, the wave 
swash reached kilometres inwards the land, and swept with it virtually everything and 
everyone who came in its way. The 2004 tsunami disaster caused shock waves for large parts 
of the global community. As my journalist informant points to, among the general public and 
the mass media alike, it seems to exist a tendency to search for culprits which in its turn will 
influence the development of public opinion in the time following. The first question we ask 
is whose fault is it? Then comes what action must be taken, and with which means? (Douglas, 
1992) 
As I will elaborate in the following chapter, different view and plans of actions was 
discussed at numerous conferences after the disasters. However, since the earthquake 
triggering the tsunami actually was registered by seismic stations world wide, the easy way 
can be to place the responsibility on the failure to warn the people at risk. After all, humans 
do not possess the ability to control earthquakes. A global demand for action to prevent this 
from happening again arose quickly, and it did not take long before a tsunami early warning 
system became the subject of debate. In response to the tsunami disaster, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an intergovernmental organisation of 10 Southeast Asian 
countries, held a Special Leaders’ meeting in Jakarta, January 6th 2005. At this meeting, 
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched a 977 million US dollar flash appeal 
for emergency aid, and the United Nations were requested by the ASEAN Leaders to lead the 
process of establishing and Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System 
(UN/ISDR)  
 24
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Currently Existing Tsunami Early Warning Systems   
The Pacific Ring of Fire is the most tsunami prone area in the world. As a reaction to the 
destructive Alaskan Pacific-wide tsunami in 1946 killing 165 people (EM-DAT database), the 
United Nations government established a seismic sea waves warning system, which in 1948 
became the Pacific Tsunami Warning System. This was initially operating only in the United 
States and Hawaiian areas, but was expanded to cover all countries bordering the Pacific after 
the Chilean tsunami of 1960, killing an estimated 2000 people. Additionally, project 
THRUST (Tsunami Hazards Reduction Utilizing Systems Technology) was established off 
the Chilean coast in 1986 to secure more efficient warning for local tsunami, enabling 
authorities to issue warnings within two minutes.  
When initiating warnings, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) Weather Radio system now communicates directly to the public via 
very high frequency transmission (Bryant, 2005). But since its construction, no Pacific-wide 
destructive tsunami has occurred, and the system has therefore never been properly tested. 
The Master Plan for the tsunami warning system for the Pacific from 1999 states that there 
have been registered at least 18 local tsunami between 1975 and 1998 in the region. In these 
cases the present tsunami mitigations efforts at the time were not able to reduce the damage 
caused by the hazard. Through the International Monitoring System, the Pacific Tsunami 
Warning Centre registered the earthquake that triggered the Indian Ocean tsunami. On the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) web page of continuous 
updates of earthquakes and tsunami warnings, the earthquake and its magnitude and location 
was stated, but concluded that no danger of a Pacific wide tsunami existed:  
 
 25
Building Resilience 
************************************************************** 
TSUNAMI BULLETIN NUMBER 001
PACIFIC TSUNAMI WARNING CENTER
0315 PM HST 25 DEC 2004
TO - CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE STATE OF HAWAII
SUBJECT - TSUNAMI INFORMATION BULLETIN 
THIS BULLETIN IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. NO ACTION REQUIRED. 
AN EARTHQUAKE HAS OCCURRED WITH THESE PRELIMINARY PARAMETERS
ORIGIN TIME - 0259 PM HST 25 DEC 2004 
COORDINATES - 3.4 NORTH 95.7 EAST 
LOCATION - OFF W COAST OF NORTHERN SUMATERA 
MAGNITUDE - 8.0 MOMENT 
EVALUATION 
BASED ON ALL AVAILABLE DATA A DESTRUCTIVE PACIFIC-WIDE TSUNAMI IS 
NOT EXPECTED AND THERE IS NO TSUNAMI THREAT TO HAWAII. REPEAT. A
DESTRUCTIVE PACIFIC-WIDE TSUNAMI IS NOT EXPECTED AND THERE IS NO TSUNAMI
THREAT TO HAWAII. 
THIS WILL BE THE ONLY BULLETIN ISSUED FOR THIS EVENT UNLESS 
ADDITIONAL DATA ARE RECEIVED.
**************************************************************
Source: PTWC Bulletin  
Figure 2.1: Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre Bulletin of the Indian Ocean Earthquake and 
Tsunami.  Source: http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc/olderhmsg  
 
 
The Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting System (DART) 
The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) is an inter-agency task force on 
disaster reduction. This United Nations agency is responsible for facilitating the coordination 
of disaster reduction actions within the United Nations system and its member states. 
According to ISDR, early warning is defined as “[t]he provision of timely and effective 
information through identified institutions, that allows individuals exposed to hazard to take 
action to avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for effective response”. It is further stressed 
that early warning systems are one of the key factors in disaster reduction strategies. (ISDR: 
Living with risk).  
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The DART system is presently regarded as the most effective and reliable tsunami 
warning system and this type has been operating in the Pacific Ocean during the last years. In 
order to detect and estimate the size of a tsunami one has to measure the magnitude of the 
earthquake, identify the location and depth at sea, and also the focal mechanism in order to 
decide if there has been generated vertical movement of the sea floor. Seismic data and 
coastal sea level data are important components of the technical system, but standing alone 
they suffer from vital limitations. In fact, very few submarine earthquakes generate tsunami, 
and seismometers are in any case not capable of measuring tsunami sizes, but only the 
earthquake. Coastal sea level stations will be able to determine whether or not a tsunami is on 
its way as effect of and earthquake but cannot measure the deep-ocean tsunami energy 
propagating towards land.  
The technical DART system consists of two parts: A bottom pressure recorder and a 
surface buoy with related electronics (NOAA: DART System – System Overview). The 
seabed element “talks” to the surface element by acoustic telemetry, which means 
transmitting data captured by instrumentation and measuring devices to a remote station 
where it is recorded and analysed. Since tsunami are the only waves with movement at deep 
sea levels, these are the only waves the system measures. The bottom pressure recorder 
measures the pressure of the overlying water, and when the pressure suddenly rises, the 
tsunami mode is triggered and acoustic signals are sent to the surface buoys. From there, the 
signals go via satellites to a remote station where the data are collected and analysed (see 
figure 2.1). The bottom pressure recorder is capable of measuring tsunami with amplitude 
down to one centimetre at 6000 meters ocean depth.  
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Figure 2.2: DART II schematic diagram.  
Source: http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/tsunami/Dart/dart_ref.html
 
The DART system is a real-time reporting system with two types of data reporting modes: 
Each hour there are scheduled transmissions of four fifteen minutes average values of sea 
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level and a system engineering status indicator. The reporting mode shifts to triggered 
transmission if a tsunami has been detected, and the system then transmits fifteen seconds 
values until the estimated tsunami amplitude is less than three centimetres during a four hours 
period. In 1995, the testing of the prototype system off the Washington-Oregon coast at 2600 
meters depth, showed data losses of approximately five per cent, and the technical system is 
considered to be reliable. In addition to the bottom pressure recorder and the surface buoy, the 
system includes buoys that measure the wave height closer to the costal areas. If they show 
that no potentially damaging tsunami has been generated, the warning can be withdrawn. 
 In this chapter I have presented a general introduction to the tsunami hazard and the 
technical parts of the warning system that is being implemented in the Indian Ocean when this 
is written. I have done this to provide background information for the case, and I will now 
move away from the hard sciences of geology and engineering towards the direction of the 
social sciences: In the following section, I will elaborate the theoretical framework for thesis.
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Chapter Three 
 
World Risk Society 
Before I introduce the presentation and analysis of the report from the World Conference on 
Disaster Reduction, I will in this chapter establish the theoretical framework of the case. The 
theories will all revolve around the subjects of risk, vulnerability and disasters, and how the 
world society conceptualise them and subsequently cope with them.  
We are surrounded by risks. Risks such as acid rain, terrorism, the avian flu, natural 
hazards, and nuclear accidents have become parts of our daily lives. The risk society is the 
new modernity. These are the words of the German Sociologist Ulrich Beck. In 1986 he 
published the book Risikogesellschaft – Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne in which he 
developed a new understanding about the modern society and the effects of scientific and 
technological development and globalisation. His theory revolves primarily around global 
technological and ecological risks, and the book was received with extra attention as it was 
published shortly after the Tsjernobyl disaster in 1986. Today he holds position as one of our 
time’s most influential social theorists, and his works have in the recent years frequently been 
used in relation to the risk of terrorism. The theory on the world risk society is based on the 
thought that society is constantly going through gradual transitions, and it is first and foremost 
a theory claiming that the risk society is the product - or side effect - of scientific and 
technological development and globalisation. Beck claims that the societal production of 
wealth goes hand in hand with the societal production of risk, and he holds the techno-
economic development responsible for the uneven distribution of risk in the global society. 
Sooner or later, Beck says, societies will go from being based on capital and production to a 
new paradigm mainly concerned with the risk associated with a technological society (Beck, 
1992). 
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Another social scientist devoting his research to exploring the relationship between 
technology and society is Professor Wiebe Bijker. He is also a central figure within the STS-
field, and in the article The Vulnerability of Technological Culture, he points to recent 
terrorist attacks to demonstrate how vulnerable our modern societies are. He further claims 
that living in a technological culture such as ours inescapably involves living in a vulnerable 
world: “To live in an open, changing and innovative culture, we must pay the price of 
vulnerability. (…) Vulnerability seems to be a condition sine qua non for innovation” (Bijker, 
2004, p1. Italics in original). While Beck speaks of the risk society, Bijker speaks of the 
vulnerable society. I will argue that in most regards they are occupied with the same subject 
as neither concept can be seen in isolation from the other. But there are, however, some 
differences between the two theorists. Bijker describes vulnerability as a system’s condition, 
“to its ability to resist, cope with, and possibly recover from events that could reduce the 
system’s functional integrity” (Bijker, 2004, p5). Risk, on the other hand, he describes as an 
outcome-oriented notion, which conceptualises the effects of a possible disruptive and 
harmful event (Bijker, 2004, p5). But, as I will argue more in detail later on, where there exist 
no vulnerability, there will exist no risk neither. When Beck claims that risks are the products 
of modern science and technology, Bijker says that the western societies are more vulnerable 
because they are technological societies. But according to Bijker, seen from another point of 
view, the opposite can also be true; namely that the same societies have for instance never 
been so protected from natural hazards like flooding or cyclones due to technological 
measures, such as flooding dikes and accurate forecasting. In Bijker’s own words:  
 
“This seemingly contradictory diagnosis—that technology makes modern societies more 
vulnerable, while at the same time making societies more safe—would of course only be a 
problem for an essentialist concept of vulnerability: a society is ‘really’ vulnerable to some 
degree. The constructivist concept of vulnerability that I proposed in the previous section 
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recognizes that a society can be constructed by certain actors, with certain aims, and under 
certain conditions, into being vulnerable; while the same society can be argued to be relatively 
invulnerable in another context or from another perspective” (The Vulnerability of 
Technological Culture, p10).   
 
In Biker’s view, vulnerability should not be treated like something that simply should be 
fought, avoided or repaired. He favours the precautionary approach in regard to technological 
development, and further holds that vulnerability should be treated “with the intellectual 
respect it deserves” (Bijker, 2004 p12). What exactly Bijker means with “intellectual respect”, 
can probably be interpreted in a number of ways, but the way I understand it, Bijker advocates 
for conscious and careful development and progress of technology. Beck, on the other hand, I 
will argue stands for a more deterministic view on the modern society, which leaves less 
space for action. According to Beck, the scientific and technological development is the 
source of the risk, and therefore it is illogical to introduce more science and technology as 
solution. As risks increases, so does the development of instruments of rational control to 
cope with them, the modern society is increasingly occupied with preventing and managing 
risks, which are the outcome of its own production. Beck characterises risk as “anticipation of 
catastrophe”, and when destruction and disasters are anticipated it produces a compulsion to 
act. Herein, Beck says, lies the irony of risk; “[t]he irony of the promise made by scientists, 
companies and governments, which in wondrous fashion contributes to an increase of risk” 
(Living in the World Risk Society, p5). He claims that the big question today is how to 
hinder, trivialise, defuse and canalise those risks and threats that are systematically produced 
by the processes of advanced modernisation, and questions about technologies that are 
developed in the arenas of nature and society are disguised as questions about political and 
scientific “handling” (Beck, 1997). “If we were previously concerned with externally caused 
dangers (from the gods or nature), the historically novel quality of today’s risks derives from 
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internal decision. They depend on a simultaneously scientific and social construction. Science 
is one of the causes, the medium of definition, and the source of solutions to risks” (Beck 
1992, p155. Italics in original).  
According to Beck, being at risk has become a human condition in the 21st century. 
Risk in itself is nothing new, but what is new about it is the de-localised character is has 
engaged. Global risks like air pollution, nuclear accidents or natural disasters do not respect 
borders. Today’s risks are the inevitable outcome of modernisation; they are products of the 
total industrial machinery, and they grow systematically in pace with its further development. 
The fact that we face an increasingly amount of risks every day is a side effect of the triumph 
of capitalism, which is ironic when our intentions really are to make the world a better and 
safer place. This macro-sociological theory about modernisation further proclaims that risk, 
like wealth, is subject of distribution. According to Beck, risk is not something you simply 
“have” like wealth is, but rather something you are given and which you cannot control. 
Although the pattern of distribution of risk differs from that of wealth, it does not exclude that 
certain risks are distributed uneven to social groups or classes. In fact, Beck goes as far as 
saying that television pictures from the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster brought proofs of the 
first rule of risk into our living rooms: Catastrophic risk follows the poor (Living in the World 
Risk Society, p11), and here he adds another concept to his theory; the risk related to social 
vulnerability – which is the type of risk Wiebe Bijker also speaks of. In this way we can say 
that both wealth and risk follow the pattern of hierarchical class distinction, but while wealth 
allocates on the top, risk allocates on the bottom. The rich and resourceful can to a certain 
degree buy security and resilience through education and information, insurance and solid 
houses on safe ground, and they will always have the best conditions to recuperate after any 
disruptive event.  
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Underlying Risk Factors  
Even though, Beck says in World Risk Society (1999), natural disasters can equal the 
destructive potential of modern mega-technologies in hazardousness, risk to natural disasters 
differs from the techno-scientific risks he is primarily concerned with. The reason he gives for 
this distinction is that risk to natural disasters are not based on decisions, or more specifically, 
decisions that focus on techno-economic advantages, like for example nuclear power plants 
(p50). Although neither Beck nor Bijker are primarily speaking of risk or vulnerability to 
natural disasters, I will nevertheless try to show how the increasingly amount of natural 
disasters world wide can also be seen as a product of this new modernity. In the Hyogo 
Framework for Action 2005-20015, a United Nations document that will be analysed in the 
next chapter, reduction of the underlying risk and vulnerability factors is on the list of 
strategic goals for disaster reduction the following decade. The common punch line in Beck’s 
and Bijker’s theories of world risk society and the vulnerable world society is that the 
underlying factors, the real root causes for risk and vulnerability are embedded in the 
historical development of science and technology and globalisation. However, since a 
Neolithic regression is highly unlikely, the solutions to cope with the underlying risk factors 
to disasters - in line with Beck’s and Bijker’s theories – always involve using more science 
and technology in order to change the social, economic and environmental conditions that 
generate risk.  
How people at risk, and people dealing with risk reduction, define exactly what 
constitutes risk, will always influence choices they make in both pre- and post-disaster 
situations. For instance, when a tsunami early warning system is introduced as part of the risk 
reduction strategy for tsunami, it means that the decision makers define the mere lack of such 
technology a risk factor. Risk perception is never born out of nothing, but entrenched in social 
practices and experiences. As different people define disasters and risk to such differently, 
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they will also prepare for and handle them in different ways in coherence with the specific 
definition one gives for ground. States and state agencies define disaster risk in one way, 
experts define them in another, and people directly affected in yet a different way. And if we 
listen to Beck, it should be no surprise if technology is presented as the solution to risk 
reduction to natural disasters.  
Disaster management and policy in risk reduction have also changed considerably over 
time. During the second half of the 20th century the western world witnessed a period with 
technological advancement, which contributed very much to the knowledge of mechanisms of 
natural phenomena we have today. However, this knowledge was mainly concentrated in the 
natural sciences, and the estimation of risk equalled the probability of an event to occur. 
Disasters were seen as being the same phenomena that caused them. It was not until the 1970s 
it became more common to refer to, for instance, seismic hazard instead of seismic risk. The 
study of natural disasters have a long tradition within science and technology, but it is only in 
the last three decades or so that the social sciences made serious entry on the field and shed 
new light to the subject. Disciplines such as geography, urban planning, economics and 
environmental planning contributed to the rethinking of risk and vulnerability, extending the 
understanding of natural disasters (Cardona, 2004), and today disaster studies have become a 
separate discipline in social sciences. 
I will now present the academic direction of risk-theories, dealing more specifically 
with risk to natural disasters, which I will call the arena of academic disaster theories. In 
contrast to Beck and Bijker, these scholars do not focus on risk directly related to 
technological failure, but direct the attention towards technological developments and their 
consequences where they can impinge on people’s vulnerability to extreme natural events 
(Blaikie et al). Ben Wisner and Ian Davis are among the scholars who are recognised as 
central thinkers in the field of disaster reduction, and they both participated in the World 
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Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe, representing their respective Austrian and 
American governments. In 1994, these two, together with Piers Blaikie and Terry Cannon 
published the book At Risk: Natural hazards, people’s vulnerability, and disasters, which 
represents a critical approach in disaster research, condemning the “naturalness” of disasters. 
In this book, the authors elaborated an analytical tool in the search for explaining why 
disasters happen in terms of social vulnerability, the “pressure and release model”, which 
constitutes one of the most widely recognised analytical frameworks in academic disaster 
circles. I have also found that this model is frequently referred to by the United Nations and 
several other disaster agencies (see for instance ISDR: Living with Risk, UNESCO: Water: A 
Shared responsibility)  
With the recognition that disasters are always connected with risk, vulnerability and 
development, it emerged a growing acceptance that disasters are not necessarily departures 
from “normal” social functioning, and that recovery does not mean a return to normal (Blaikie 
et al, 1994). It is even not always immediately clear when an extreme event have turned into a 
disaster. The criteria for classifying the impacts of a natural hazard as disaster depend on 
notions of what constitutes threat and normality, and is invoked in a set of historically, 
socially and culturally constructed principles (Bankoff, 2004). The emergence of the notion of 
vulnerability in disaster studies has contributed to an important shift from the hazard-centred 
paradigm of seeing disasters as the inevitable outcome of natural forces, to a more proactive 
view of disasters and people’s vulnerability as complex socially constructed processes. This 
turn in theoretical orientation has also brought with it useful tools for assessing vulnerability 
and capacities. The pressure and release model (PAR) is a relatively simple, but useful 
analytic tool commonly used to provide understanding of cause and effect in regard to natural 
disasters. The basic idea behind the model is that disasters are created in the intersection 
between two opposing forces: On the one hand there are the processes producing 
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vulnerability, and on the other the actual exposure to the physical hazard (Blaikie et al, 1994). 
It is difficult, if at all possible, to decipher the exact individual links between risk and poverty, 
risk and race, risk and exclusion, etc., since the degree of risk people faces in relation to 
natural disasters depends on the intrinsic relationship between vulnerability and hazard. 
According to the pressure and release model, disaster risk reduction should start by 
investigating the progression of vulnerability, which according to the model is related to a 
series of social factors, divided into root causes, dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions: 
 
• The root causes are the relatively distant underlying causes to vulnerability due to 
limited access to power, structures and resources. They refer to a set of well-
established social, political and economic processes within a society and the world 
economy. These causes contribute to the production and re-production of vulnerability 
over time, and are usually a function of economic structure, legal definitions of rights, 
gender relations and other ideological issues. They are also a reflection of power 
relations in a society. Marginalised people, whether economically, socially or 
demographically, tend to be of marginalised importance to political decision makers as 
well. In sum, these processes create two interrelated kinds of vulnerability: Less 
secure livelihoods and access to vital resources lead to high levels of vulnerability, and 
secondly, the groups in question are likely to suffer from low priority from decision 
makers in issues of disaster mitigation. The root causes of vulnerability may often go 
centuries back and are often complicated to identify. The pattern of developing and 
developed countries in the world finds its roots in multiple political and economical 
causes related to global historical development through centuries. 
• The root causes are processes which impacts are highly likely to lead to dynamic 
pressures. The micro-processes of dynamic pressure are characterised by lack of 
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social institutions, local investments and markets, press freedom and ethical standards 
in public life. Affecting macro-processes can be those of rapid population growth and 
urbanisation, debt repayment and environmental degradation.  
• The dynamic pressures translate the effect of the root causes into unsafe conditions, 
which are certain forms of insecurity that will influence the vulnerability of people in 
relation to specific hazards. The unsafe conditions include fragile physical 
environment, such as living in dangerous locations or weak building structures. Fragile 
local economy is also a factor, leading to low-income levels and unstable livelihoods. 
In a vulnerable society, one can often identify special groups at risk, for example 
elderly people, small children or women, and further lack of local social institutions to 
help them. The unsafe conditions are enhanced by absence or lack of public actions, 
such as disaster preparedness and prevalence of endemic diseases. These are all factors 
that influence people’s ability to cope with and recover from external shocks, such as 
natural hazards (Blaikie et al, 1994, pp 23-24).  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Illustration of the pressure and release model. 
Source: A framework for vulnerability analysis in sustainability science 
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Using the pressure and release model, the processes of vulnerability production can be 
summed up as following: Root causes trigger the dynamic pressures, which again lead to 
unsafe conditions. When the unsafe conditions intersect with hazards, disasters will be 
created. In the end, the explanations of disasters can most often be tracked back to the root 
causes, and vulnerability to natural disasters is hence created by social systems in which the 
state apportions risk unevenly among its citizens. For example, when following the pressure 
and release model in the 2005 New Orleans Flooding case where almost two thousand people 
were killed, unsafe houses and lack of possibility to evacuate, will fall under the category 
unsafe conditions. The fact that floodwater management and preparedness only covered 
hurricanes up to category three on the Saffir-Simpson scale can be identified as a dynamic 
pressure strongly contributing to the production of the unsafe conditions. Apparently, a plan 
for upgrading and reinforcement of the levees protecting the city was suggested, but cuts in 
the federal budget did not allow it. Ergo there are also economical processes on macro-level 
participating in the generation of vulnerability of the people at risk. According to the pressure 
and release model, vulnerability to natural hazards is also depending on time-span. In this 
view, the level of vulnerability reflects developments that was started long before their long-
term consequences are revealed, which are dependent on factors such as power, wealth and 
differential vulnerability (Douglas, 1992; Beck, 1986). The root causes also reflect power 
relations in a society, and hence they will often change as a consequence of dispute. 
Following the pressure and release model, long-term risk reduction must take the dynamic 
underlying causes for vulnerability seriously, or the disasters will recur and strike the most 
vulnerable communities time and again (Blaikie et al, 1994).  
The pressure and release model can be said to be an archetypal reduced-form model of 
vulnerability analysis. Although it may serve as a useful analytic tool in vulnerability 
assessment, one can argue that it may be insufficient, as it does not address the coupled 
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human-environment system in the sense of considering the vulnerability of biophysical 
subsystems (A framework for vulnerability analysis in sustainability science). The authors 
themselves also recognise the model to be static, as it is not adequately integrated with the 
ways hazards affect people. The pressure and release model also strikes me to be somewhat 
too linear in its portrait of the progression of vulnerability as social, political and economical 
processes are too complex to be comprehended as a strictly linear historical development. All 
factors connected to root causes, dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions interact with each 
other, and these processes will continually produce and re-produce vulnerability. However, I 
think the pressure and release model succeeds in demonstrating that the risk people face is 
always the outcome of the complex interaction between vulnerability and hazard, and that a 
disaster is the intersection between these two opposing forces (Bliakie et al, 1994). 
Is it possible to link academic disaster theories, exemplified by the pressure and 
release model, with Beck and Bijker? Blaike et al seek to understand risk to natural disasters 
in terms of vulnerability, and in this regard, neither risk nor vulnerability can be considered in 
isolation from the other. And the root causes that are identified as the fundamental underlying 
source of vulnerability to disasters in the pressure and release model are, in line with Beck, a 
set of social, political and economic processes within a society and the world economy. Are 
these not outcomes of human decisions based on the desire of economic advantages? I think it 
will be safe to claim that Beck, Bijker and Blaike et al all hold lack of economical resources 
and the global techno-scientific and economic patterns as directly and indirectly major causes 
for risk and vulnerability, both at micro and macro level. Beck holds human choices 
motivated by the desire for techno-economic development as key cause for modern risks. 
Bijker’s approach concentrates less on the explanatory factors of the historical development 
of vulnerability factors, and rests his focus on the more contemporary interaction between 
technology and society. His conclusion is that vulnerability is an inevitable consequence of 
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living in a technological culture, and at the same time, this vulnerability is a necessary 
prerequisite for the advanced technological society we live in (The Vulnerability of 
Technological Culture). As a crucial point in the pressure and release model, we find global 
economic pressures connected to the workings of the world economy. And, as explained by 
Blaikie et al, after the Second World War the patterns of financial relationships between 
developed and developing countries still have heavy repressing effects on the latter part. 
Traditional export products such as minerals and agricultural commodities suffer from falling 
prices, while indispensable import products like energy and technology have become more 
expensive. Additionally, foreign debts are heavy burdens on already poor economies, and 
many developing countries are forced to spend as much as forty to fifty per cent of their 
export incomes on debt servicing (Blaikie et al, 1994). Consequently, the needs to export at 
any cost are intensified, resulting in a vicious circle pressing prices even lower. Economic 
pressure can generate environmental degradation such as deforestation, which frequently has 
led to more severe droughts and floods. Changes in social structure, as a result of factors like 
urbanisation and the increasing tendency to leave the traditional farming income source for 
paid jobs, has led to break ups of the extended family, which traditionally has been an 
important form of support during crises. Vulnerability in terms of economy can thus be 
identified both on macro and micro levels, but still the two cannot be seen as independent 
from each other. Global economical pressure can lead to difficult situations for national 
economies, and therefore the governments fail to secure jobs and provide welfare to its 
citizens. Distribution of and access to resources are vital to vulnerability analysis. In general, 
it is fair to claim that those with better access to resources such as the means of production, 
tools and equipment, and large social networks are less vulnerable to hazards and have better 
chances of recovering. If a rich family loses six of their ten cows in flooding while a poor 
family loses their only one, the loss of the rich family may well be grater in absolute terms, 
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but still less in relative terms. In that respect, distributions of wealth and power are perceived 
as major explanatory factors for disasters as they determine the level of vulnerability of the 
people at risk. The pattern of distribution of resources will frequently have its say about why 
natural hazards turn into disasters fore some and others not (Blaikie et al, 1994). This is also 
in accordance with Beck and his theory on the unequal distribution of risk. As we gradually 
move from society based on capital and production to the new modernity of the risk society, 
we concurrently move from class positions to social risk positions (Beck, 1992). 
 
Strategies for Risk and Vulnerability Reduction 
As I have repeatedly argued, the type of solution one presents for a problem always depends 
on the causal explanation the solution is based on. Annelies Heijmans, currently the Asia 
Coordinator at the Centre for Conflict Prevention in the Netherlands, pertains to the domain of 
academic disaster theorists and has long experience with disaster reduction. Building on 
various authors dealing with historical overviews of understandings of vulnerability, she 
presents in the article From Vulnerability to Empowerment a model of three different views 
and resulting strategies to address vulnerability: 
 
• If societal structures, including socio-economic and political processes lie to ground 
for vulnerability, the problems need solutions of political character. Reducing 
vulnerability due to societal structures need a long-term solution demanding change in 
the political and social structures that continually produce and re-produce poverty and 
vulnerability (Heijmans, 2004, p 116). 
• Cost can also be a vulnerability generator. Disaster management is a costly affair, and 
even though the scientific and technological capacities, as well as theoretical 
knowledge about what efforts and need to be taken, people continue to suffer because 
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of lack of economical resources to carry them out in action. When cost is the cause of 
vulnerability, it needs economic and financial solutions, such as safety nets, insurance 
and financial assistance to build up people’s assets (World Bank, 2001, p 135; 
Heijmans, 2004, p116). 
• When nature is regarded the cause of vulnerability, we tend to introduce scientific and 
technological solutions. The domain of disaster science and management has 
traditionally belonged to a hazard centred paradigm where nature and science is seen 
as separate forces, and is dominated by the view that nature needs to be controlled 
through expert knowledge and modern administration (Escobar, 1999; Hilhorst, 2004). 
Vulnerability is hence considered as generated by hazards, depending on intensity, risk 
and exposure in terms of proximity. In this train of thought, vulnerability needs to be 
reduced through the implementation of predicting and warning systems. 
 
In reality, I will argue, these three domains are not mutually exclusive as the different causes 
for vulnerability most often are inter-dependent on each other. Heijmans’ model of different 
causes to vulnerability, articulates the logic deduction that cost, as cause of vulnerability, 
needs economical and financial solutions. However, for countries with soaring amounts of 
foreign debts and poor national economy in general, there will often be a wide range of 
pressing vulnerability issues that need attention, and not only in regard to natural hazards. 
If we, in line also with Beck, acknowledge the root causes to risks and disasters as the 
consequences of globalisation and scientific and technological development, can they ever be 
changed? And what about the disasters theorists themselves, those who claim to have found 
the answer, are they not part of this modern Enlighten-based science and technology 
production process? The pressure and release model of the progression of vulnerability as 
outlined above can, strictly speaking, be referred to as the “pressure model” only. To provide 
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a “release model”, Blaikie et al (1994) simply suggest reversing it to illustrate the progression 
of resilience. Beck has elaborated a theory about the modern society in which he explains how 
society has become as it is, without making any particular efforts to suggest solutions to his 
criticism. In fact, the theory may be too deterministic to be able to provide solutions: We have 
come to a point beyond return. He does, however, remark that his utopia for a “responsible 
modern” is technological (or ecological) democracy where the consequences of technological 
development are debated before decisions are made. Bijker, on his side, suggests that maybe 
there is no need for a “solution” in the essentialist sense of the word, but things will work 
themselves out if we only start treating vulnerability with intellectual respect. As a Dutchman, 
he can hardly take the same critical position as Beck considering that the Netherlands can 
exist only thanks to the dike technology keeping the country from permanent flooding. As he 
so pertinent remarks in Sociohistorical Technology Studies: “God created the world, but the 
Dutch made Holland!” (p235). Unlike Beck, he contends that scientific and technological 
progress can both produce risks and make society safer at the same time. In that sense, Blaikie 
et al are the only theorists presenting a concrete strategy for reducing risk and vulnerability. 
Following the pressure and release model, risk and vulnerability reduction demands 
intervention in the causal factors, and step one will be to address the root causes by increasing 
the access of vulnerable groups to power structures and resources, and challenge any 
ideology, political or economic system that contributes to augmentation of vulnerability. In 
contrary to Beck, Blaikie et al deny that the root causes to disasters should be regarded as 
immutable. Suggested actions are, for instance, to erase foreign debt and intensify efforts to 
mitigate population growth. In order to reduce the dynamic pressures, development of local 
institutions and investments, education, press freedom and ethical standards in public life are 
important priorities. On macro level, work on population and urbanisation programs, 
reschedule debt programs and reforestation are crucial points. Transforming the unsafe 
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conditions to safe conditions requires development of resilient local economies and protection 
of the environment with safe locations, hazard-resistant buildings and infrastructure, and 
diversification of rural income opportunities to strengthen livelihoods. Public actions like 
disaster preparedness and warning systems can also contribute to the achievement of safe 
conditions (Blaikie et al, 1994). 
The question at hand today is how we are going to cope with risk and vulnerability to 
natural hazards, how we can increase the resilience of the people at risk. This question is 
exactly what represented the main concern at the World Conference of Disaster Reduction 
held in Japan in January 2005. In the following chapter I will give a presentation and analysis 
of the United Nation’s report from the conference, aiming at gaining knowledge about the 
“world society’s” understanding of natural disasters, risks and vulnerabilities, and further the 
solutions and strategies presented to cope with them. 
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 Chapter Four 
 
World Conference on Disaster Reduction 
In the wake of the devastating Indian Ocean disaster, the United Nations called for the World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction hosted in Kobe, Hyogo in Japan, January 18-22, 2005. The 
Conference, turning out to be the largest gathering with disaster reduction on the agenda in 
our time, aimed at increasing the international profile of disaster risk reduction, and is today 
considered to represent a landmark event in international cooperation and commitment to 
reduce the impact of natural disasters worldwide. Multiple governments, intergovernmental 
organisations, local authorities, United Nations bodies, non-governmental organisations, 
experts, as well as international financial institutions, are among the well over 4000 people 
who attended the five-day Conference in order to share good practices and experiences 
concerning disaster reduction and management. 
 The outcome of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction is adopted in three 
negotiated resolutions, each pointing to specific recognitions, goals, strategies and actions 
towards building resilience to disasters. The Hyogo Declaration constitutes a conceptual 
framework for disaster reduction, and is in particular committed to include disaster 
management and vulnerability mitigation within the wider frame of sustainable development 
and poverty eradication. The Hyogo Framework of Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience 
of Nations and Communities to Disasters aims at promoting a strategic and systematic 
approach to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters, and staking out the needs and means to 
build the resilience of nations and communities at risk. The third resolution, Report of the 
Credentials Committee, includes the document called Indian Ocean disaster: risk reduction 
for a safer future. This statement is primarily concerned with the establishment of a tsunami 
early warning system in the Indian Ocean, which was agreed upon already at the Special 
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Leaders’ meeting of the Association of South-East Asian Nations held in Jakarta, January 6, 
two weeks earlier (Report of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction). These documents 
are, however, non-binding and can only serve as “blueprints” to the committed nations, 
organisations and individuals. Subsequently, there will always be a chance that the adoptions 
are merely rhetoric.  
In this chapter I intend to conduct a content analysis of the key documents constituting 
the Report of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction. I will carry out this analysis with 
the overall aim of exploring the conditions that are given as ground for disaster reduction 
strategies, and what type of solutions that are presented. Since the main objective of this paper 
is to find out how disasters are conceptualised and interpreted, and consequently the solutions 
with which they should be fought, I will keep a special focus on the presented strategies for 
disaster reduction. These will also be discussed in light of the theories presented in the 
previous chapter.    
 
Background 
During the last three decades it has become more and more common to use the term 
vulnerability when explaining natural disasters. However, it was not until the 1970s and the 
early 1980s that the vulnerability approach to disasters started to gain territory among 
scholars, born out of a rejection of the assumption that disasters are caused in any simple way 
by external natural events. Until then, a range of prevailing perspectives existed in the field, 
none of which in reality dealt with the issue of how society creates the conditions for natural 
hazards to cause disasters. The most common approach was actually strictly naturalist, 
blaming disasters exclusively on the ungracious forces of nature, leaving humans as powerless 
victims (Blaikie et al, 1994). Today it is commonly accepted that disasters have to be dealt 
with in the wider frame of social and economical processes and that we in fact possess the 
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power to reduce the impact of natural hazards on human societies. And this acknowledgement 
is of course the background for organizing the World Conferences on Disaster Reduction, 
namely the recognition that if the international community mobilise in the work for reducing 
disaster impact, we can build the resilience of nations and communities through efforts such 
as ensuring good governance, risk assessment and education. In the exact words of the Hyogo 
Declaration: “Disaster risks, hazards and their impact pose a threat, but appropriate response 
to these can and should lead to actions to reduce risks and vulnerabilities in the future” 
(Hyogo Declaration, p2).  
The 1990s represents a turning point concerning drawing attention to the subject of 
disaster reduction. This International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) 
designated by the United Nations represents an important change of focus as attention was 
now directed towards disaster risk reduction, thus moving away from the traditional focus 
exclusively on disaster response and recovery. In this context, the first World Conference on 
Disaster Reduction was held in 1994, in Yokohama, Japan. The outcome of the conference is 
concentrated in the Yokohama Strategy, which contains guiding principles for disaster 
prevention, reduction and mitigation, emphasising the importance of risk assessment, disaster 
prevention and awareness, vulnerability reduction, early warning, as well as demonstration of 
political commitment for implementing disaster reduction policies (ISDR). Already at the first 
World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Yokohama, the date for the second World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction was set for Kobe in January 2005, and at this second 
conference, the Yokohama Strategy was reviewed. The committee responsible for the 
evaluation found that ensuring more systematic action in the work for disaster risk reduction 
constitutes a major challenge in the coming years. As the second conference took place only a 
few weeks after the Indian Ocean tsunami, the importance of such an event became even 
more evident, and the enormous attendance broke all previous records. 
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The Hyogo Declaration 
The full Report from the second World Conference on Disaster Reduction opens with the 
Hyogo Declaration, a three page document which sums up broad-spectrum aims for reducing 
natural disasters worldwide. The Hyogo Declaration stresses the importance of dealing with 
disasters not only in order to reduce disaster losses of lives and property, but in particular to 
promote social development and human values, and recognises disaster reduction as a cross 
cutting issue in the efforts needed to enable nations’ sustainable development, and also reach 
the United Nations Millennium Development Goals2. Although taking place in the shadow of 
the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, the declaration sends out a strong message of faith and 
serious commitment from the international community to face the challenges of disaster 
reduction.   
Throughout the full report from the World Conference on Disaster reduction, there is 
demonstrated a strong urge to underpin the complexity of vulnerability to natural disasters, 
and hence the importance of dealing with natural disasters in a broad spectre. During the last 
decade we have witnessed a growing commitment to disaster risk reduction, reflected in 
numerous international agreements, programs and declarations, but the actual realisation of 
such initiatives has often proven somewhat slow (Building disaster resilient communities). A 
central issue concerning concrete actions in disaster reduction is the question of who is going 
to take responsibility for the radical actions that are needed to reach the goals of disaster 
reduction worldwide. The Hyogo Declaration firmly asserts that the individual States have the 
“primary responsibility to protect the people and property on their territory from hazards, and 
thus, it is vital to give high priority to disaster risk reduction in national policy, consistent 
with their capacity and the resources available to them” (p2). But at the same time the 
Declaration repeatedly calls attention to the importance of involving all stakeholders, 
                                                 
2 The eight United Nations Millennium Development Goals form a blueprint agreed upon by all the Nations in 
the world, formulating 8 goals ranging from halving extreme poverty and hunger to halting the spread of 
HIV/AIDS by the year of 2015 (UN Millennium Development Goals). 
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including governments, regional and international organisations, financial institutions, civil 
society, including non-governmental organisations and volunteers, the private sector and the 
scientific community. Since disaster reduction is recognised to be a long-term country-
specific process depending heavily on national ownership and leadership, each State is 
encouraged to establish national platforms for disaster risk reduction in order to coordinate 
the stakeholders. A national platform for disaster risk reduction is defined by ISDR as a 
“nationally-owned and led mechanism (…) that serves as advocate for disaster risk reduction 
at different levels and advice on action through a coordinated and participatory process” 
(ISDR Guiding Principles). However, as we have learned from the recent tsunami disaster, 
impacts of natural disasters may and often will, depending on the scale, affect people and 
states external of the national borders of the specific state in which it originated. Both the loss 
of lives and the economic support required in the aftermath of a disaster can be a burden to 
the entire global society, and global problems demand global solutions. Subsequently, during 
the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, United Nations Member States 
called for and adopted the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. The ISDR is 
designed to be a body for inter-disciplinary involvement and its primary responsibilities is to 
assist in the national platforms construction processes, coordinate, guide and implement 
disaster reduction strategies in close cooperation with disaster management institutions (ISDR 
Guidelines). The need for such a coordinating body is perhaps particularly important in 
regions where neighbouring countries are in strife. 
 The Declaration further states that a culture for disaster prevention should be fostered 
at all levels, ranging from individuals to the international community, and the resilience of 
nations and communities to disasters should be built through what is referred to as people-
centred early warning systems, risks assessments, education, and other pro-active integrated, 
multi-hazard and multi-sectoral approaches and activities (Hyogo declaration, p2). These 
 51
Building Resilience 
statements are clear recognitions of the importance of disaster reduction being dealt within 
what is referred to as multi-level and multi-sectoral approaches, ranging from community 
based disaster education to national and international economical and legislative frameworks. 
This is also an outcome of the wider acknowledgment that multilateral action and 
international partnerships are more effective than individual action, and this is especially 
important since disasters cannot be expected to respect national borders. It appears clearly that 
the Hyogo Declaration has pondered the complexity of natural disasters and that the 
participants at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction conclude that reducing and 
coping with disasters have to be dealt with in cross-sectoral holistic terms. The repeatedly 
reference to cross-sectoral approaches is probably related to the traditional separation 
between natural and social sciences, which treat the hazard and the social aspects of disasters 
separately, each with their own specialists. This separation still exists today, and it appears 
that the Hyogo Framework for Action identifies cooperation across sectors and creation of a 
broader platform as a major challenge in work on disaster reduction. 
Through the Hyogo Declaration, the delegates recognise “the intrinsic relationship 
between disaster reduction, sustainable development and poverty eradication”, and that 
“[d]isasters seriously undermine the results of development investments in a very short time, 
and therefore, remain a major impediment to sustainable development and poverty 
eradication”. And further, “[d]isasters remain a major threat to the survival, dignity, 
livelihood and security of peoples and communities, in particular the poor” (p1). What do 
these statements actually mean? The recognition of the intrinsic relationship between disaster 
reduction, sustainable development and poverty eradication can contain multiple meanings. Is 
it an equal relationship? Does the one lead to the other, and if that is the case, in which order? 
The line of thought in the Hyogo Declaration can perhaps be illuminated by an analysis of 
these sentences. By reading the first sentence in isolation, the first meaning that comes to my 
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mind, is that work on disaster reduction must be connected with work on sustainable 
development and poverty eradication because disasters overwhelmingly affect the poor and 
less developed countries and communities. The first interpretation can then be as following: 
This intrinsic relationship is constituted by the fact disasters jeopardise development for the 
poor, and disaster reduction is important in the work for sustainable development and poverty 
eradication because disasters cause development setbacks equalling decades. When reading 
further, the next statement supports this interpretation by saying that disasters undermine the 
results of development investments in a very short time. I dare claim that few will contradict 
this claim, as time and again throughout known history, this has proven to be correct in 
disaster situations connected to for instance earthquakes and cyclones. It is further stated in 
which ways disasters can be a hinder to development, namely because they pose a threat to 
the survival, dignity, livelihood and security of peoples and communities, and then again, in 
particular to the poor. To sum up: On the one hand we have the vulnerable people and 
communities, and on the other we have the hazard, with the potential to trigger a disaster if 
striking the vulnerable. And as further stated in the Hyogo Declaration; “[h]uman societies 
have to live with the risk of hazards posed by nature” (p2). Like Beck also points to, 
experience has in ruthless ways shown that developing countries in fact are disproportionately 
exposed to risk, and harder affected by natural disaster compared to their richer neighbours. 
What can that tell us?  
Let us try an alternative direction for the sake of the argument I wish to emphasise, 
namely that the causal connection one lies to ground is crucial when elaborating a solution to 
the problem in question. What if we turn the first statement around and make it look like this: 
“We recognise the intrinsic relationship between sustainable development, poverty 
eradication and disaster reduction”. Semantically the meaning of the sentence appears the 
same, except for maybe one subtle nuance of difference due to change of order of the key 
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words. The statement can now be interpreted as, in stead of reducing disasters because they 
are impediment to sustainable development, we have to start with fostering sustainable 
development in order to strengthen people’s resilience to disaster. The Hyogo Declaration 
sends out a strong message of healthy ethics concerning human values and sustainable 
development linked to disaster reduction, but what the declaration maybe fail to pinpoint - and 
this is important - is that poor and less developed countries, communities and individuals are 
also vulnerable to disasters by the very virtue of being poor and less developed. For instance, 
the poor is often forced to move to places situated in dangerous surroundings such as 
riverbanks, near volcano slopes etc, and they have the poorest housings and less access to 
resources. Yet another key point is social inclusion. Marginality and exclusion in terms of 
political voice is a crucial matter in terms of access to livelihood options, to natural resources, 
to information, to political influence, and to the justice system (Beyond Kobe). When turning 
the order of priority around in this key statement, it becomes easier to see that not only do 
disasters pose a threat to development, but disasters can also be created because of lack of 
development. When saying that disasters impede development and cause poverty and hunger, 
the solution to the problem would be different than when saying that poverty and lack of 
development are contributing factors to the creation of disasters. The point I am attempting to 
underscore is the significance of the attribution of causality to disasters: If we blame natural 
forces for creating disasters and hence poverty and hunger, the solution would be to tame or 
control nature. If we hold societal conditions responsible for creating disasters, we try to 
change society. From reading the Hyogo Declaration, we understand that disasters are created 
when hazards hit vulnerable communities, which means that causality is attributed to both 
nature and society. Then the solutions to disasters should be sought both in controlling nature 
and in societal changes. But since we cannot control or tame nature (at least not when it 
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comes to rapid-onset hazards such as earthquakes and tsunami), the best we can do is to 
monitor it, using advanced science and technology.    
 By now it seem evident that the common conceptualisation of natural disasters among 
disaster reduction bodies is that they are created by a combination of hazard and society. Only 
if a hazard hits a vulnerable community, the disaster becomes reality. So what we get is a 
viscous circle: Disasters produce and reproduce peoples’ vulnerability to disasters. They are a 
major impediment to development, but we cannot seriously reduce disasters or disaster 
impacts until we have reduced poverty and furthered sustainable development of vulnerable 
nations and communities. There is, however, one sentence that implicitly recognises this 
view. In the introductory section of the Declaration, it is stated that “development investments 
that fail to appropriately consider disaster risks could increase vulnerability” (p1). If one says 
that bad development can be a contributing factor in creating disasters, then one also says that 
that good development can reduce them?  
 The Hyogo Declaration furthermore refers to the challenges associated with disaster 
reduction. As this document only serves as a conceptual framework, this is done only in a 
general turn of phrase, again pointing to the necessity of coping with and reducing disasters in 
order to strengthen nations’ and communities’ sustainable development. What is striking 
about the Hyogo Declaration is, in my opinion, the “soft” approach to disaster reduction 
initiatives. Hard technology remedies such as early warning systems, which have been subject 
to extensive debate and media focus, are only mentioned once throughout the document:
   
“We can and must further build the resilience of nations and communities to disasters through 
people-centred early warning systems, risk assessments, education and other proactive, 
integrated, multi-hazard, and multi-sectoral approaches and activities in the context of the 
disaster reduction cycle, which consists of prevention, preparedness and emergency response, 
as well as recovery and rehabilitation” (Hyogo Declaration, p2). 
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This section is the only one mentioning instrumental solutions to disaster risk reduction. In 
stead we see a wide focus on building resilience to natural disasters through collective efforts 
of creating a culture of disaster prevention by means of risk assessment and education.   
Big words and good intentions about disaster reduction are summoned in the World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction Hyogo Declaration. And in my opinion, that is of course 
how it should be. Still, I think it is important to pay attention to how the causal connections of 
disasters are defined, and investigate them in relation to the concrete recommendations 
presented at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction. The concrete actions and strategies 
for disaster reduction are collected and elaborated in the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-
2015, and in the following section I will give a presentation and combined analysis of this 
framework.  
     
Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and 
Communities to Disasters 
Great expectations were, and still are, associated with The Kobe Conference on Disaster 
Reduction as it represents a landmark event and an extraordinary opportunity to set the future 
global standards for disaster reduction strategies. The twenty-four page document Hyogo 
Framework for Action: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters 
builds on the Yokohama Strategy from 1994, and determines to pursue “the substantial 
reduction of disaster losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of 
communities and countries by 2015” (p3). Serious disaster risk reduction has to promote 
concrete strategic and programmatic actions, and in the Hyogo Framework for Action the 
actual needs and means, directions and priorities for disaster reduction for the next decade are 
identified and verified by the participators of the conference. 
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 The Report opens with a short section on challenges posed by disasters. Like the 
Hyogo Declaration, the focus here rests primarily on the grave impact disasters have on 
development and human values, the importance of international cooperation, and on 
vulnerability generating factors. This first section deserves to be quoted in full due to its 
comprehensive elaboration of risk and vulnerability factors: 
  
“Disaster loss is on the rise with grave consequences for the survival, dignity and livelihood of 
individuals, particularly the poor, and hard won development gains. Disaster risk is 
increasingly of global concern and its impact and actions in one region can have an impact on 
risks in another, and vice versa. This, compounded by increasing vulnerabilities related to 
changing demographic, technological and socio-economic conditions, unplanned urbanisation, 
development within high-risk zones, under-development, environmental degradation, climate 
variability, climate change, geological hazards, competition for scarce resources, and the 
impact of epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, points to a future where disasters could increasingly 
threaten the world’s economy, and its population and the sustainable development for 
developing countries. In the past two decades, on average, more than 200 million people have 
been affected every year by disasters” (Hyogo Framework for Action, p1). 
 
In line with the theories presented in the previous chapter we see here that risk is defined in 
terms of increasing global concern. The vulnerability factors listed, such as technological and 
socio-economic conditions and under-development, are also issues that can bee seen as rooted 
in complex socio-economic processes and an effect of the new modernity. In this section it is 
also emphasized that, in spite of the growing awareness about the value of disaster risk 
reduction, disasters continue to pose a global challenge, thereby pointing to a knowledge-
action gap. It is underlined that disaster risk reduction strategies have to be integrated into 
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policies, plans and programs for sustainable development and poverty eradication since these 
are mutually supportive objectives. 
 After the introductory section we find a short section presenting the review of the 
Yokohama Strategy, aiming at identifying the gaps and the lessons learned since the 
Yokohama Conference ten years earlier. The review commission calls in particular for more 
systematic action to address disaster risk in the context of sustainable development, and 
specific gaps and challenges are identified in the following five main areas: 
 
1. Governance: Organisational, legal and policy frameworks; 
2. Risk identification, assessment, monitoring and early warning; 
3. Knowledge management and education 
4. Reducing underlying risk factors; 
5. Preparedness for effective response and recovery. 
(Hyogo Framework for Action, pp2-3) 
 
According to the report, these five key areas constitute the very foundation for developing a 
relevant framework for action in the decade 2005-2015. In the development of the specific 
priorities for action, the report further names a number of general considerations that will be 
taken into account. Again the report calls attention to the primary responsibility of each State, 
and at the same time our collective international responsibility, the demand of particular 
attention to developing countries due to the high level of vulnerability, and that a gender 
perspective together with cultural diversity, age and the variety of vulnerable groups should 
be taken into account as appropriate. It is also underpinned that risk assessment and early 
warning systems are essential investments that “protect and save lives, property and 
livelihoods, contribute to the sustainability of development, and are far more cost-effective in 
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strengthening coping mechanisms than is primary reliance on post-disaster response and 
recovery” (Framework for Action pp4-5). Drawing on the findings referred to above and the 
review of the Yokohama Strategy, the report moves on to the actual priorities for action for 
the next ten years, which are listed as follow (p8): 
 
1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with strong 
institutional basis for implementation 
2. Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning 
3. Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience 
at all levels 
4. Reduce the underlying risk factors 
5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels 
 
Each of these five points are further elaborated, noting that States, regional and international 
organisations should take the key activities pertaining to each point under consideration, and 
implement them as appropriate to their own circumstances and capacities (Hyogo Framework 
for Action p6). The acknowledgement that there is no one universal solution to disaster 
reduction, but that each state or region has to fashion the general strategies suitable to their 
own circumstances and capacities, is at the same time a recognition that vulnerability to 
disasters is not a static, but rather dynamic outcome of changing societies, and cannot be 
described in objective and context independent terms. In line with Beck, Bijker and Blaikie et 
al, we see here that risk and vulnerability is regarded as social constructions entwined in 
complex and interconnecting social, economical and historical processes. 
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Risk Assessment for Risk Reduction 
The first point on the list of priorities of action towards disaster resilient societies is further 
specified by a statement ascertaining that countries should develop institutional and legislative 
frameworks and disaster risk reduction policies. Such institutions must be established in order 
to achieve the ability to “develop and track progress through specific and measurable 
indicators” (Hyogo Framework for Action, p6). The countries that manage to do so will gain 
better capacity to assess and manage risks, and to achieve widespread consensus and 
engagement to disaster risk reduction across sectors. From the report, it is not easy to 
understand exactly what risk assessment involves although it is frequently repeated that it 
constitutes a vital premise for risk reduction. I had to turn elsewhere to find a definition, and 
at the ISDR Terminology web page risk assessment is defined as “[a] methodology to 
determine the nature and extent of risk by analysing potential hazards and evaluating existing 
conditions of vulnerability that could pose a potential threat or harm to people, property, 
livelihoods and the environment on which they depend”. When trying to find out more about 
the actual risk assessment process, I found that the academic disaster scholar Ian Davis 
suggests in his article Progress in Analysis of Social Vulnerability and Capacity (2004) to 
divide the assessment process into three areas of evaluation and estimation. Firstly there are 
the physical conditions, meaning the evaluation of buildings, infrastructure, agriculture, etc. 
Then there are the economical conditions, including evaluation of economical assets, incomes 
and industrial production. Thirdly we find the social conditions, which take account of the 
vulnerability of livelihoods, incomes, community resilience and coping mechanisms (Davis, 
2004, p136).  
The systematisation of risk assessment data has become feasible through the 
development of the technical geographic information systems (GIS). This computer program 
can comprise layers of data on various hazards, vulnerability assessment information, disaster 
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impact data, the locations of critical facilities and evacuation routes. GIS provides 
possibilities for grouping, comparing and analysing data in order to reveal complex 
connections. But still, the data has to be collected by humans, and each GIS can therefore only 
be as reliable as the information inserted into the computers. The most problematic of these 
areas is assessment of social vulnerability, since such factors are difficult to quantify. This 
means that accurate data has to be collected by people who are especially familiar with each 
specific local situation, and at the same time are trained to organise sample surveys (Davis, 
2004). Systematic and thorough risk assessment is undoubtedly a time and resource 
demanding process, and most poor developing countries will probably have great difficulties 
in finding professionally qualified assessors and the money and resources required to 
undertake such a task. The national governments within each country carry the responsibility 
for protecting its people against disasters, but the political reality in many developing 
countries is characterised not only by lack of financial recourses but also political will to give 
priority to work on disaster mitigation. However, in the last section risk reduction, the report 
states that one of the key activities should be to  
 
“[p]romote community participation in disaster risk reduction through the adoption of specific 
policies, the promotion of networking, the strategic management of volunteer resources, the 
attribution of roles and responsibilities, and the delegation and provision of the necessary 
authority and resources” (Hyogo Framework for Action, p7).  
 
In this statement the community-based disaster reduction is explicitly valued. When 
theorising risk assessment, Ian Davis finds that there are several benefits in what he refers to 
as de-professionalising the assessment and risk-reduction process (most importantly in regard 
to social risks) wherever this can be a possibility for three reasons: To cut costs related to 
hiring experts; to expand and accelerate the urgently needed process of mapping vulnerability 
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and capacity; and to strengthen community learning to enable each society to protect its own 
citizens (Davis, 2004, p140). When it comes down to it, time and again the locals prove to be 
the ones standing in the front line fighting disasters. During the last three of decades, the 
value of community-based disaster preparation building on existing coping mechanisms has 
been increasingly appreciated, particularly among non-governmental organisations. This 
understanding among NGOs has grown out of the acknowledgement that top-down 
technology-fixed disaster initiatives did not result very successful in reducing the 
vulnerability of people at risk (World Disasters Report, 2004). 
 
Enhancing Early Warning  
The elaboration of point two on the list of priorities for action opens with a statement telling 
us that the starting point for reducing disaster risk lays in the knowledge of hazards and the 
vulnerabilities that societies face, followed by action based on this knowledge (Hyogo 
Framework for Action, p7). As key activities, risk assessment is referred to again, along with 
the promotion of early warning systems and capacity building. Concerning the section on 
capacity building, the recommended activities involves primarily the application of scientific 
and technological remedies in order to ensure the “sustainability of the infrastructure and 
scientific, technological, technical and institutional capacities needed to research, observe, 
analyse, map and where possible forecast natural and related hazards, vulnerabilities and 
disaster impacts” (Hyogo Framework for Action, p8). This part appears as very instrumental 
and technological fixed as it proceeds with advocating development of databases for 
monitoring and early warning purposes, improvement of scientific and technical methods and 
capacities for risk assessment, monitoring and early warning, space technologies and 
communication tools. As demonstrated by Heijmans and the three paradigms, when it comes 
down do dealing with the concrete natural hazard, scientific and technological solutions 
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dominate the problem solving process. Or, as Beck claims, when it comes down to dealing 
with risks and hazards in general, we always turn to scientific and technological solutions. 
This reaction is a distinguishing characteristic of the modern society, which continuously 
contributes to the production and re-production of risks. I believe Bijker would partly agree 
with Beck in this, only in a less critical way: Technologies, or rather the tendency to always 
turn to technological solutions, do not only generate and re-generate risk, but can also 
contribute to building resilience as well.   
The report underscores the importance of developing early warning systems that are 
“people centred, in particular systems whose warnings are timely and understandable to those 
at risk, which take into account the demographic, gender, cultural and livelihood 
characteristics of the target audiences” (Hyogo Framework for Action, p8). The Hyogo 
Framework for Action further advocates integration of early warning system into government 
policy to make sure they are subject to regularly system testing and performance assessments.  
The report carries on with stating that an early warning system should include guidance on 
how to act upon warnings, and support effective operations by disaster managers and other 
decision makers. At this point I wish to remind you that although taking place shortly after the 
tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 deals with all types 
of natural disasters. During the past ten years before the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, nearly 
tree quarters of all disaster related deaths occurred due to hydrometeorological events. 
Drought and famine proved the absolute deadliest, taking the blame for at least 275.000 
deaths from 1994 to 2003. However, death tolls from hydro-meteorological disasters are 
decreasing, to a great extent due to improvements of satellite forecasting and early warning 
systems (World Disasters Report, 2004, p163). Hydrometeorological events are fairly easy to 
monitor, and hurricanes and cyclones can be foreseen up to a week on beforehand. Technical 
early warning systems that monitor extreme meteorological events are today well functioning 
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in most parts of the world. But as the quote above indicates, the issue of timely warning is in 
itself not sufficient to avoid disaster.  
Another point I wish to mention is that timely communication of warning and safe 
evacuation in disaster preparedness and response represent great challenges. In big cities the 
technical part of issuing timely and understandable warnings to the public will be less 
complicated than in the rural areas, as people have more reliable access to means of 
communication and infrastructure. On the other hand, if millions of people evacuate at the 
same time, panic, car accidents, crime and looting in addition to economic losses and public 
health risk related to inadequate sanitation in contemporary overcrowded shelters, can be 
potential consequences of mass evacuations. In low population density settlements, the 
evacuation process has potential of working more smoothly than in big cities. With rapid-
onset hazard threats such as earthquakes or tsunami, the time limit for getting out of harm’s 
way will most often be a very critical point. When an alert is issued, and tens or hundreds of 
thousands, or even millions of people are given one hour to evacuate to safer ground, chaos 
and panic will break out for certain. Major city evacuations have the potential to cause 
disaster in its own right, maybe of even larger disastrous dimensions than the hazard alone 
(Blaikie et al, 1994). 
Natural disasters are not restricted to developing countries. A recent example of this 
took place on Monday 29 August, 2005, when Hurricane Katrina, a category 5 storm, strikes 
the American city of New Orleans and surrounding areas. In the Katrina case, a technical 
monitoring and warning system was considered to be nearly perfect, still almost two thousand 
people perished and the area suffered damage for billions of dollars. The United Nations 
recognises that the people who suffered the most from Katrina’s impact are those who were 
social vulnerable due to lack of private vehicle or cash, and could not afford to evacuate (UN: 
What went wrong? Was there an early warning system in place?). It became quite clear that 
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also in a developed country such as the United States, the catastrophic risks follow the poor 
and marginalised, as it was particularly the poor and elderly members of ethnic minorities 
who suffered the brunt of the disaster (UN/COHRE). Motives for hesitating evacuation can be 
the fear of looting of abandoned homes, which goes in particular for poor and uninsured 
people. In the aftermath of hurricane Katrina this fear did in fact prove realistic, and numerous 
military forces attempting to keep the situation under control were stationed in the city. The 
Katrina disaster is a tragic but excellent example of the importance considering social 
vulnerability very seriously when developing early warning systems.  
 
Knowledge, Innovation and Education for a Culture of Resilience 
The main motivation behind the fourth point on the list of priorities of action seem to be the 
conviction that disasters can be reduced if the people at risk are well informed and aware 
about the potential hazards they are facing. As a vital step towards fighting ignorance, all 
stakeholders should improve communication and share good practices and knowledge about 
disaster reduction technologies. The key point here is to collect and provide understandable 
information on disaster risks and protection options, and this education should consider the 
specific traditional and indigenous knowledge and cultural heritage pertaining to each 
community at risk for natural hazards. The report further tells us that this goal requires “the 
collection, compilation and dissemination of relevant knowledge and information on hazards, 
vulnerabilities and capacities” (Hyogo Framework for Action, p9).   
 Under the headline Information management and exchange, the report encourages 
information management and exchange on a “higher” level, such as strengthening of networks 
among disaster experts, managers and planners across sectors and between planners, 
promotion and improvement of dialogue and cooperation among scientific communities. I 
consider this a particularly important issue, as my view on natural disasters is that they must 
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be seen as constructs and always the outcome of co-production between a wide range of 
contributing factors, including both the natural environment and the social, economic and 
political circumstances in which the people at risk find themselves at any time. As my 
informant Professor Debarati Guha Sapir at the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters in Brussels (CRED) strongly asserted, given the complex “nature” of disasters 
managing bodies should not be separated, but to a substantial higher degree integrated. This 
means that disaster reduction must be dealt with in a holistic rather than in a sectoral 
perspective, creating more synergistic effects among the different actors in the network. Such 
an approach requires effective cooperation between multilateral development agencies, 
national and local governments, NGOs, natural and social scientists, businesses, technical 
specialists, and last but not at least, vulnerable communities themselves. Furthermore, the use 
of recent information, communication and space technologies, as well as earth observations 
are also promoted as integrated components for the purpose of disaster risk reduction. In the 
longer term, states are encouraged to establish local, national, regional and international 
directories, inventories and national information-sharing systems and services in order to 
improve the exchange of information on good practices, cost effective and applicable disaster 
risk reduction technologies, and experiences concerning policies, plans and measures for the 
common purpose of disaster reduction (Hyogo Framework for Action, p10).     
 The list continues with a section on education and training, where the inclusion of 
disaster risk education in school curricula is promoted as an important initiative. Although 
doubtlessly being an essential step, I wish to point out that it can also be somewhat 
problematic since many poor and marginalised families in developing countries cannot afford 
to send their children to school. Where this is the case, an alternative can be community-based 
training with the purpose of strengthening local capacities. A wide range of NGOs have had 
community-based disaster reduction on their agendas for decades, but this approach has its 
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weaknesses too. Although proving effective at local level, these initiatives will have limited 
outreach, and face great challenges in scaling up. In her research on disaster management 
after Hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua, Katarina Allen warns about the danger of depoliticising 
vulnerability issues. An inherent danger of placing responsibility with those who do not have 
the jurisdiction or political power to address the deeper issues related to reducing risk, such as 
policy-making, is fragmentation of the work into small scale initiatives specifically focusing 
on one hazard alone (World Disasters Report 2002). The Hyogo Framework for Action also 
points out that risk reduction efforts should not be carried out in isolation from policy-making 
and the institutional environment. Separation of small-scale and large-scale disaster reduction 
is artificial and creates a distance to the underlying causes of vulnerability.  
 
Reduce Underlying Risk Factors for Disaster Reduction 
The fourth point on the list over priorities for action treats in particular the risk factors related 
to “changing social, economic, environmental conditions, and land use, and the impact of 
hazards associated with geological events, weather, water, climate variability and climate 
change”, which should be addressed in sector development planning and programs as well as 
in post-disaster situations. Among the key activities suggested to reduce these risk are 
environmental and natural resource management through actions such as better land-use 
planning and vulnerability reduction through development planning (Hyogo Framework for 
Action, pp10-11). 
With regard to social and economic practices, promotion of food security and 
diversified income options are mentioned, and the development of financial risk-sharing 
mechanisms such as insurance should be fostered. The integration of risk reduction planning 
into the health sector, first and foremost thinking of the construction of disaster resilient 
hospitals, is also underscored as a vital premise for risk reduction. Additionally, schools, 
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water and power plants, communication and transport lines are critical facilities that need to 
be properly protected so they can function in a potential disaster situation (Hyogo Framework 
for Action, p11). For instance, the overwhelming majority of people who die in earthquakes 
are killed by the collapse of man-made structures that cannot handle the impact of extreme 
seismic forces. Long term planning and investment in safer housing and infrastructure are 
crucial components in disaster reduction since the degree of vulnerability is also decided by 
demographic patterns, conditions of housing and infrastructure. Such factors are related to 
public policy and administration, and the state of disaster management at organisational level. 
Rebuilding a society in post disaster situations should exploit the opportunity to construct 
more hazard resilient homes and livelihoods. Land use planning, rural and urban planning 
along with other technical measures, should be incorporated into risk assessments based on 
social, economic and environmental impact assessments (Hyogo Framework for Action, p12).  
I interpret these statements as favouring the focus on social production of vulnerability 
when evaluating risk; we must seek to understand risk in terms of vulnerability. A general 
equation often used is that risk = vulnerability x hazard. The level of risk depends on the 
interaction of hazard and vulnerability, so there is no risk where there is no hazard, or when 
the population’s vulnerability equals nil.  
 
Strengthen Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response 
While the first four points on the list of priorities concentrate on identifying measures to 
reduce disasters impact, the fifth and last point on the list deals with impact mitigation when a 
hazard has already stricken and the disaster is a fact. Even though considerable damage and 
loss of lives can be directly associated with the direct impact of hazards, the following days 
can be just as critical because of the urgent need of temporary housing, food supply and 
sanitation facilities to avoid more fatalities: “At times of disaster, impacts and losses can be 
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substantially reduced of authorities, individuals and communities in hazard-prone areas are 
well prepared and ready to act and are equipped with the knowledge and capacities for 
effective disaster management” (Hyogo Framework for Action, p12).  
Key activities in this respect are identified as strengthening of policy, technical and 
institutional capacities in national, regional and local level disaster management, as wall as 
dialogue and coordination among early warning, disaster response and sustainable 
development with the aim of encouraging a holistic approach to cope with disasters. 
Promoting the establishment of emergency funds, ensuring access to food relief supply and 
evacuation drills are also mentioned as important activities to strengthen disaster 
preparedness. Collection of money and resources for disaster relief is rarely considered to be 
the biggest problem. In response to the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, NGOs like the Red 
Cross and Doctors Without Borders received so much earmarked money that they had to ask 
for permission to transfer some of it to other projects. Unfortunately, the general tendency 
shows that disasters with high media attention receive a sudden influx of money, but poorer 
countries often lack the resources to follow up disaster mitigation and management after the 
media attention has subsided and flows of funding have returned to normal (Christoplos, 
2003). According to CRED, global funding patterns show that it is disaster relief, and not 
disaster prevention and reduction, which receives the absolutely greatest amount of money of 
all disaster management funding. This funding pattern is considered a good indicator of the 
real priorities (Development at risk). Although the United Nations, and even common sense, 
tells us that disaster prevention is far more cost effective, and not at least more human than 
disaster relief, this pattern does not seem to change. 
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Special Session on the Indian Ocean Disaster: Risk Reduction for a safer 
Future 
As already mentioned, the establishment of a tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean 
was called for already at the Special ASEAN Leaders’ meeting in Jakarta, January 6, 2005. 
The Public Declaration from that meeting is understandably first and foremost concerned with 
mobilising and coordinating the resources to meet the pressing need for emergency relief such 
as clean water and shelter. Only few points on the declaration treats issues of long-term 
efforts on disaster reduction, among which we find the urge to “[e]stablish a regional warning 
system such as Regional Tsunami Early Warning Centre on the Indian Ocean and the 
Southeast Asia Region” (Declaration from the Special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting, p3).  
As proposed at the Special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting, the World Conference on Disaster 
Reduction held a special session in response to the recent tsunami disaster, where the 
participants pledged their support to the construction of a tsunami warning system in the 
disaster struck region. In this session, the general recognitions about disaster concerns from 
the Hyogo Declaration were carried on, emphasising the importance of regional, national and 
international cooperation and coordination, the establishment of well functioning mechanisms 
including “inter alia specialized collaborative centres, networks for information exchange, 
early warning systems, establishment of databases and knowledge management, use of 
modern science and technology, and strategies to reduce disaster risks and to reduce impacts 
arising from natural disasters”. The most concrete point in this common statement appears to 
be that the delegates are “responding to the request to launch a process to establish a regional 
early warning system, including for tsunami” (Common Statement of the Special Session on 
the Indian Ocean Disaster, p1). By this statement, the delegates pledge their support to the 
construction of a tsunami early warning system in the Indian Ocean. It is further emphasised 
that the early warning system must be tailored to the specific circumstances of the region, and 
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the countries affected should be the ones who determines the shape and nature of the system, 
under coordination of the United Nations. The declaration points out that early warning 
systems consist of the four following parts (p2): 
 
• Prior knowledge of the risks faced by communities 
• Technical monitoring and warning service for these risks 
• Dissemination of understandable warnings to those at risk  
• Knowledge, public awareness and preparedness to act 
 
Even though many of us may think of a tsunami warning system as only technological, the list 
above shows that such a system is defined by the participators on the Special Session on the 
Indian Ocean Disaster in terms of disaster education and preparedness as well. Based on the 
four parts of a tsunami early warning system, we see that the conceptualisation of a tsunami 
disaster is not restricted to the tsunami hazard itself, but also includes a range of contributing 
social factors. This definition of tsunami disasters is in agreement with the statements in the 
Hyogo framework for Action where the causality of disasters is conceptualised as a 
combination of hazard and social conditions. The Indian Ocean Tsunami Early Warning 
System is consequently shaped in accordance with this definition. In order to prevent or 
mitigate disasters, the solution must subsequently follow the logic of the definition and target 
both the hazard and the social condition in order to increase the resilience of the people at 
risk.  
I have in this chapter presented and discussed the main goals and strategies for disaster 
reduction for 2005-2015, as defined in the three declarations in the report from the World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction. In the next and concluding chapter I will sum up the most 
central findings and carry out the final analysis and conclusion based on these.
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Chapter Five 
 
Conclusion 
In this thesis I have chosen to investigate how the most central disaster management bodies 
conceptualise disasters and subsequently develops the strategies and means to reduce natural 
disasters, keeping a particular focus on technology. By analysing the Report from the World 
Conference on Disaster Reduction, I was able to identify the most fundamental interpretations 
of disasters, the global goals set for disaster reduction for the 2005-2015 decade, and the 
strategies promoted for fighting them. The starting point for the thesis was the implementation 
of a tsunami early warning system in the Indian Ocean in reaction to the 2004 tsunami 
disaster, and the theories I have used as framework all revolves around the subject of social 
vulnerability and risk to hazards in different approaches. Ulrich Beck and Wiebe Bijker are 
both engaged in the analysis of risk and vulnerability related to modern technologies, while 
the theoretical direction represented by scholars like Ian Davis and Piers Blaikie is chiefly 
concerned with social vulnerability directly linked to natural disasters. In this final chapter I 
will sum up the key findings and discussions of the thesis.  
 
Hazards are Natural, Disasters are not 
Modern disaster theories proclaim to deal with the underlying structural causes of disasters in 
order to go to the heart of the processes creating vulnerability to natural hazards. Their key 
target of investigations is how disasters are created in complex interaction between the natural 
environment and human societies. In this point of view, vulnerability is seen as always a 
dynamic outcome of different social, political and economic factors affecting the level of 
resilience and people’s capability to tackle a hazard. That is both the ability to anticipate and 
resist, and cope and recover when the hazard already has struck. The Hyogo Framework for 
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Action 2005-2015 also underscores that reducing social vulnerability to natural disasters 
represents a key point. It is repeatedly pinned down that risk assessment, education on 
preparedness and response, and all strategies for disaster risk reduction should be factored 
into policies, planning and programming on disaster risk reduction.  
Even though it has to be recognised that certain geographical regions are more at risk 
to earthquakes, floods and droughts than others, the World Conference on Disaster Reduction 
recognises that geographical location is only part of a wide range of inter-connected causes of 
vulnerability. Most importantly there are factors connected to the general political, social and 
economic situation that influence the level of vulnerability. Demographical patterns forcing 
people to live in areas at risks, such as at the slopes of a volcano, flood plains of rivers et, are 
central issues. Hence, in analysing disasters, there is no way around including the broader 
patterns of societal factors. Piers Blaikie et al. argue that “disasters are often a complex mix of 
natural hazard and human action” (1994, p5). In this view, hazards are natural, but disasters 
are not. Consequently, disaster theorists choose to adopt a global vulnerability analysis 
approach because, in contrast to the natural hazard, vulnerability-producing processes are 
socially constructed and linked to levels of development. We cannot do much to prevent 
earthquakes from happening, but we can reduce the level of vulnerability of the people at risk. 
A problem definition of disasters as being man-made will also require people-centred 
solutions, and today most NGOs working on disaster preparedness and mitigation have left 
the technocratic top-down management approach in favour for community-based disaster 
reduction. The Hyogo Framework for Action also highlights that community based training 
and education is just as important as governmental disaster management. Tangible assets, 
physical means like food, safe housing and relief, are of course important resources, just as 
financial assets such as income and insurance are crucial to increase people’s resilience and 
capacity. But equally important, though less “concrete”, are the non-tangible assets. Human 
 74
Building Resilience 
assets like alternative skills, training and disaster awareness, social assets like community 
organisation, self-help and solidarity, and political assets such as representation in decision-
making, and the ability to lobby leaders for action. For millions of people around the world, 
disasters are a part of every day life, and the non-tangible assets are just as important as the 
tangible to increase resilience against disasters and ensure sustainable livelihoods (World 
Disasters Report 2004).  
 
Rapid-Onset Hazard Warnings 
According to Blaikie et al, one of the most frequent responses by outside actors to disaster 
reduction is the provision of various technologies in relation to relief and rehabilitation 
activities. In all such cases, the authors claim, the technologies may impact the level of 
vulnerability in positive, but also in negative directions. Regarding early warning technology, 
there are examples of such systems pertaining to drought, cyclones and floods that are 
effectively reducing vulnerability to those at risk. Storms, meteorological phenomena and 
events related to them such as landslides after heavy rain fall, have for long been relatively 
easy to accurately forecast with technological equipment. Some phenomena of this character, 
such as floods, are often cyclical as well, leaving affected people with experience and 
knowledge related to the risk hazard. However, early warning for slow-onset 
hydrometeorological events differs from early warning for rapid-onset geological events. 
While early warning for hurricanes can be issued at least three or four days ahead, giving 
people at risk time to prepare evacuation and other safety measures, early warning for 
geological events can only be issued after the hazard has already struck. So the warning is 
maybe not so “early” after all, and can also contribute to new forms of vulnerability. Warning 
and evacuation in response to rapid-onset hazards such as earthquakes and tsunami can easily 
aggravate chaos and panic due to limited time, especially in larger cities.  
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In 1986, the Italian cities Lucca and Modena were evacuated in fear of earthquake after a few 
small tremors were felt in the area. 56.000 people fled their homes and jobs, 13.000 hospital 
beds were prepared, and railway carriages were geared up to assist the evacuees. Traffic jams 
and petrol shortage promptly triggered chaos, and every shop and business in both towns 
closed for two days. People waited, but the earthquake never came. Reactions from the angry 
public, in particular businessmen who lost money due to the evacuation that ultimately proved 
uncalled for, led to the resignation of the mayor and city administration shortly after. This 
case demonstrates that the risk of legal decisions to evacuate can sometimes be considered 
politically unacceptable (Blaikie et al, 1994).  
As the Lucca and Modena example shows, the monitoring of earthquakes we have 
today does not allow for prediction with the same accuracy as hazards related to 
hydrometeorological events. In regard to tsunami warnings, as explained in chapter two, 
information of an incoming tsunami will only be registered after the bottom pressure recorder 
sends signals of unusually high water pressure at deep-ocean. Then the system provides an 
opportunity to double check the potential tsunami threat by means of the buoys that measures 
the wave height closer to the coast. Time is a very critical factor in the total tsunami warning 
system, and timely and understandable warnings are fundamental conditions, along with 
timely actions from the government. As a result, a people centred early warning system can 
only be as effective as the social institutions it is embedded in. In line with Bijker, we see that 
the technology cannot be separated from the society in which it is supposed to work. This 
view is also reflected in the report from the World Conference on Disaster Reduction as 
coordination and cooperation among all relevant actors in the early warning chain is 
underlined as vital activities, together with system integration into governmental policy, 
decision-making processes and emergency management at both national and local levels 
(Hyogo Framework for Action, p8).       
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The Technologisation of Social Problems 
Numerous early earning systems exist around the world today, and the human race appears to 
have great expectations to new science and technology to make our lives more comfortable 
and safe. But in which ways do we define these problems in order to make the logical 
solutions consist of technological remedies? As the political theorist Judith Shklar points out, 
because of the technological progress during the last two generations, we may tend to have 
somewhat too high technological expectations. When forces of nature threaten human lives 
and property, we feel injustice or indifference when no one is there to defend us (Shklar, 
1990; Bijker 2004). We expect action from our politicians and decision-makers to protect us 
from danger. In regard to natural hazards, is it because we cannot control “mother nature” that 
we turn to modern science and technology in the search for protection? As Beck points to, 
today even natural hazards appear less random than they used to. Even though humans do not 
possess the power to prevent earthquakes or cyclones, we can monitor and predict them, and 
meet them with structural arrangements and emergency planning (Living in the World Risk 
Society). The technical elements of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Early Warning System are, 
when this is written, soon to be fully operational. The more social parts of the system on the 
other hand, concerning both national disaster platforms and community level preparedness, 
are on the whole not yet satisfactory attended to (ISDR: Evaluation and Strengthening of 
Early Warning Systems). And then we must ask; why is that? Is it like Beck says that the 
decision makers always turn to scientific and technological solutions, because that is the way 
the modern society always deals with a problem? And to play the Devils Advocate pushing 
Beck’s theory; can the construction of the Indian Ocean Tsunami Early Warning System 
contribute to the reproduction of risk and vulnerability as it overshadows the social 
improvements needed? Does technology provide a false sense of security? An explanation 
concerning the focus on the technical Early Warning System can also be that when a hazard 
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strikes with such extremely damaging force as the tsunami, demonstrating its existence with 
such evidence, it can easily be conceived as the prime cause for the disaster and hence occupy 
a privileged position in the causal chain. It is impossible to doubt its existence and hazard. 
“The social”, on the other hand, is less tangible, less obvious, commonly perceived as “soft”, 
and more difficult to associate with natural disasters, and therefore not given first priority.  
Beck’s theory on the world risk society is an effort to provide a universal model of 
modern risk as an effect of global scientific, technological and economic processes. Like Beck 
describes the world risk society as the outcome of man-made techno-economic and scientific 
development, the United Nations and other delegates at the World Conference on Disaster 
Reduction also recognises that risk to natural disasters are not only “natural”, but also man-
made and rooted in complex political, economical and social processes that need solutions of 
political character. In this view the immediate cause of a disaster, the actual natural hazard 
itself is not at all considered as the one and only cause, but a disaster will be created if the 
hazard hits vulnerable communities at risk. The attribution of causality exclusively to forces 
of nature involves denial of the wider historical and social dimensions of any disaster, and 
narrows the attention down to technocratic solutions (Bankoff, 2004). Therefore the Hyogo 
Framework for Action repeatedly calls for what is referred to as cross-sectoral cooperation at 
all levels in order to reduce disaster risk. Social vulnerabilities need to be assessed, along with 
strengthened political commitment to put disaster reduction on the agenda on equal footing 
with sustainable development and poverty eradication. However, many of the disaster 
reduction strategies proposed consists of technological and instrumental solutions, such as use 
of the computer-based geographical information system and the tsunami warning system. 
As concluded by the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami Warning project is only one of many steps that need to be taken in order to reduce 
peoples’ vulnerability to disasters. Now, over a year later, we can follow the progress of the 
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post-tsunami work on the UN/ISDR web pages. The ISDR can report substantial progress in 
recovery work, referring to a 90 million US dollars project of construction of safer schools in 
Indonesia, the initiation of various assessment processes, and an ISDR Disaster Reduction 
Field Library on wheels to enhance knowledge and education. However, the project receiving 
by far the most attention at the United Nations web pages is the Indian Ocean Tsunami Early 
Warning System. In an updated progress report from March 2006, the ISDR can tell about 
formidable progress in post-tsunami work such as the establishment of an interim core 
warning system with twenty-tree real time sea level stations and strengthening of the Global 
Telecommunications System. In other words, the technological progress is going great. There 
has been carried through a needs-assessment for the successful integration of the system, 
revealing that few countries operate a tsunami warning centre, and therefore lack the capacity 
to receive data. Community education and outreach programmes are not in place in most 
participating countries, and even though most countries have carried out internal assessments 
of government capacity for disaster management, assessment of community preparedness has 
not been a priority (ISDR: Evaluation and Strengthening of Early Warning Systems). The 
technical components of early warning are perhaps the most uncomplicated parts of the 
system in terms of successful implementation. The United Nations organises the project, 
including implementation and financiering, but does not possess the authority to force any 
country to follow up with national platforms, warning centres or vulnerability assessments. 
But as the decision-makers in the affected states can show to concrete and hard technology 
results, they can also tell their citizens that the warning system is up and running, so they can 
feel safe. The implementation of the technical Indian Ocean Tsunami Early Warning System 
can in this wary contribute to direct the attention away from the less tangible parts of the 
system, as it can be considered as an “addition” to society. The technology appears seemingly 
uncomplicated and neutral, but when examining the system in its whole, it becomes clear that 
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in order to make it work it has to be integrated in the political, economical and social 
processes and hence it demands nothing less a restructuring of society. At all levels, from 
governments to the fishermen, people and institutions have to adapt to the system’s demands 
in order to make it function as it is designed to do, and eventually reap from its benefits.  
On May 27, 2006, Indonesia, the country hardest stricken by the 2004 tsunami, 
suffered yet another earthquake. When this is written a week days later, Norwegian 
newspapers announce that preliminary estimations of deaths counts over 6.200, and some 
200.000 displaced. In a printed interview with Idam Samawi, district manager in the Bantul 
region, he expresses his regrets for the slow bureaucratic processes of the government, whose 
help is still absent. Sopo Nyono, a community leader in Bantul, has a ready reply to why his 
city now lies in ruins: Bricks without mortar (VG NETT, Aftenposten, 30.05.2006). 
Unfortunately, this is a strong indicator on lack of improvement in governmental disaster 
management since the tsunami disaster. Again the importance of political will and 
commitment to disaster reduction is demonstrated, since more people can perish in the 
aftermath of a disaster than of the immediate cause in shape of the hazard itself. Even though 
the technical parts of an early warning system is successfully implemented and operated, this 
will not be able do anything to prevent crisis due to outbreak of epidemic diseases, ruined 
homes, boats, harvest or entire livelihoods of families and communities if a tsunami of similar 
magnitude should strike again.  
To promote a technological solution to reduce natural disasters can fall under the 
description Beck calls the naturalisation and technologisation of social problems, which has 
become part of the modern security system and hazard management (1995, p43). In order to 
cope with risks produced by modern science and technology, we promote new science and 
technology. And herein, says Beck, lays the hazard of hazards since technological solutions 
can only lessen risks, never abolish them. Beck does not say so explicitly, but this comment 
 80
Building Resilience 
can be interpreted as a call for handling social problems in with social solutions and not with 
science and technology, which is resulting in the creation of “serial risks” (Beck, 1996, p27). 
So Beck appears to be right in his theory; the decision-makers turn to science and technology 
to reduce the risk people face. The risk – if we accept the premises of risk and vulnerability to 
natural disasters being rooted in complex historical techno-scientific, social and economical 
processes – of which they have contributed to exactly by solving societal problems with more 
science and technology.  
 
Building Resilience 
Beck claims that the risk society starts where nature ends (Beck, 1997, p276). But then again, 
is it always easy to distinguish between the social and the natural? And moreover, between 
the social and the technological? The STS tradition claims that it is not (something Beck also 
agrees to later in the chapter referred to above), and furthermore that such constructed 
distinctions are not fruitful in the study of technology – society or nature – society interaction. 
Summarised by Wiebe Bijker and his colleague John Law, “[a]ll relations should be seen as 
both social and technical (…). Purely social relations are found only in the imaginations of 
sociologists, among baboons, or possibly, just possibly, on nudist beaches; and purely 
technical relations are found only in the wilder reaches of science fiction” (Law and Bijker, 
1992, p290). In the STS approach technologies are regarded as social constructs and 
integrated parts and a characteristic trait of modern societies, and studies of technology should 
include the impact it has on society, and at the same time how it is shaped by society. An 
central element in this STS insight is that all technological systems are part of society and 
cannot function unless they are integrated in social institutions. And as we can tell from the 
Hyogo Framework for Action and the Special Session on the Indian Ocean Disaster, this 
functional integrity of the system and its sub-systems is crucial for the effectiveness and 
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operation of the system. If not all parts of the early warning system, including public 
awareness and knowledge, integrate smoothly with each other, it cannot work optimally. To 
treat the technical parts and the social parts of the system as separated from each other will 
hence be fruitless as the functionality of the system is equally constituted by all sub-systems. 
For instance, without knowledge about the hazard and understanding of the warning, the 
system cannot work. As my informant Professor Dorothea Hilhorst at the Department of 
Disaster Studies at Wageningen University so pertinent remarked:  
 
“If the message is to reach people, it has to be done in a language that resonates with their 
experiences. And it is very difficult to warn people about hazards they do not know. What you 
get is that somebody will give you a warning on the 26th of December of a tsunami, and if you 
have never seen a tsunami before, what you do is close the window. You think, well let the 
tsunami come, but you don’t know what is. It was a joke in Sri Lanka, that there was an early 
warning that the tsunami would come, and the president said: Well send somebody to the 
airport to pick him up!” 
 
According to the STS approach, not only the Indian Ocean Tsunami Early Warning System, 
but all technological systems go far beyond their technical borders, as they are inseparably 
entangled in culture and society. As Wiebe Bijker and Trevor Pinch observed in The Social 
Construction of Technological Systems (1987), the success of a technological system is often 
attributed to its technical parts, while failure is often ascribed to human error. The authors 
considers such an approach to be unfruitful and calls for more symmetry between the social 
and the technological when examining the success or failure of technological systems. I have 
tried to show that this symmetry between the social and the technological is also important in 
the Indian Ocean Tsunami Early Warning System case. Even though the technical system is 
successfully installed in the ocean, the system as a whole cannot not work as it is designed to 
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unless the social parts are fully integrated with it. The technical and the social cannot be seen 
in isolation from each other, and are equally important elements functional integrity of the 
system. 
In the section on the Hyogo Declaration (see pages 42-44), I tried to explain the 
importance of attribution of causality to disasters by analysing a statement concerning “the 
intrinsic relationship between disaster reduction, sustainable development and poverty 
eradication”, and “[d]isasters seriously undermine the results of development investments in a 
very short time, and therefore, remain a major impediment to sustainable development and 
poverty eradication” (Hyogo Declaration, p1). My point was that if we blame natural forces 
for creating disasters and hence poverty and hunger, the solution would be to tame or control 
nature, and if we hold societal conditions responsible for creating disasters, we try to change 
society. The Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System is designed to do both. Disasters are 
indeed created in complex intersections of hazard and vulnerability; of nature and society.  
The Indian Ocean tsunami provoked an unforeseen humanitarian crisis of dimensions, 
but work on reconstruction after the disaster has given the opportunity to direct attention 
towards long-term changes to increase people’s resilience to natural hazards by securing 
proper building codes, sustainable livelihoods, and not at least the ecosystem on which many 
rely (IUCN Information Paper: The Indian Ocean Tsunami). Every year natural disasters 
affect millions of people all over the world, some regions harder hit than others. Disaster 
situations are commonly handled rationally through scientific and technological solutions, 
such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System. The construction of the technical system 
appears to be the “easy” part, and it demonstrates the determined action, which the world has 
been screaming for. As argued in the report from the World Conference on Disaster 
Reduction and throughout this paper, the work must not stop there. A technological system 
will always go beyond its technical borders and include the people and the environment in 
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which it has been created and is designed to function in; the technological is also social. If all 
sub-systems of the Indian Ocean integrate smoothly with each other, hopefully we will see, in 
line with Bijker, that modern technologies do not only produce risks but also resilience.  
By applying the STS perspective in the study of technology and technological 
systems, we may be able to get a better understanding of the relationship between technology 
and society, also when it comes to disaster reduction mechanisms. Like Wiebe Bijker points 
to, vulnerability seems to be a condition for innovation. The fact that the countries in the 
Indian Ocean region proved to be vulnerable to tsunamis was the condition for implementing 
the tsunami warning system. And on the other hand, as I hope to have demonstrated in this 
paper, the warning system demands restructuring of society. Not only does society shape 
technology, but technology also shapes society. 
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Figure 6.1: Tsunami safety rules. 
Source: http://www.knmi.nl/~haak/Sumatra20041226.ppt
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